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The objective of the first essay is to examine the impact of the voluntary 
environmental policy on technological innovation in household appliance firms. The key 
hypothesis is that firms participating in the ENERGY STAR program were more likely to 
innovate in response to the 1997 ENERGY STAR criteria update than firms that did not 
participate. Because participation in the voluntary environmental policy is not random, a 
time-varying instrument variable—a participation in the Green Light Program—is used to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity. NBER patent data from 1990 to 2003 related to 
the energy efficiency of household appliances is matched with COMPUSTAT to include 
firm-level financial information. A Poisson fixed effect model with an instrument 
variable estimator reveals significant evidence regarding the impact of ENERGY STAR 
on participating firms’ patents. 
The environmental innovation literature reveals a positive relationship between 
environmental policy and innovation. However, the impact of the domestic energy 
efficiency policy on foreign innovation is underexplored. Using global patent data from 
the European Patent Office World Patent Statistical Database, an identification comes 
from two quasi-experiments: the Top Runner Program in 1998 and the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005. We find strong evidence the domestic energy efficiency policy positively affects 
domestic patenting. In addition, the analysis provides strong evidence the domestic 
energy policy leads to technological advances in foreign patenting, especially by 
Japanese inventors. Moreover, we find strong evidence the domestic policy’s uncertainty 
negatively affects domestic light-emitting diode patenting, specifically among Japanese 
inventors. 
The third essay fills the gaps in cognitive process understanding of human 
behaviors between future gasoline price perception and the willingness to purchase 
hybrid vehicles. How consumers form future gasoline price beliefs and its impacts on 
decision making process in underexplored in literature. Using the monthly Michigan 
Survey of Consumers conducted in July 2008 to November 2008, we pool five cross 
sections and run a generalized linear model. We find statistically significant evidence that 
current and long-term future gasoline price perceptions affect the willingness to buy 
hybrid vehicles. This chapter also shows the long-term future gasoline price perceptions 
predict better than the short-term future gasoline price beliefs. Understanding the effect 
of gasoline price on the willingness to buy more fuel-efficient cars has an important 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Energy-Efficiency Gap 
To achieve sustainable energy in the future, increasing energy efficiency plays a 
significant role because energy efficiency is well known as the fifth energy resource that 
promises to solve the energy crisis. The phrase “energy-efficiency gap,” coined by Hirst and 
Brown (1990) refers to the unexploited economic potential of energy efficiency. After the 
publication of Hirst and Brown's (1990) seminal paper, there has been considerable interest in 
the energy-efficiency gap. The energy-efficiency gap refers to the difference between observed 
energy-efficiency investment and the technically feasible, cost-effective alternative (Hirst & 
Brown, 1990; Brown, 2001). Although there is controversy1 about the size of the energy-
efficiency gap, there is evidence that a sizable energy-efficiency gap does exist and we can pick 
the so-called low-hanging fruit by using proper policy instruments to close the energy-efficiency 
gap. 
The energy-efficiency gap has several causes. According to Hirst and Brown (1990), the 
energy-efficiency gap can originate from two causes: structural barriers and behavioral barriers. 
While behavioral barriers result from individual decision-making regarding end-use energy 
consumption, structural barriers result from the actions of public and private organizations. 
Additionally, Jaffe and Stavins (1994) identified market failures and non-market failures as 
                                                 
1 Allcott and Greenstone (2012) argued that the energy-efficiency gap would be small than most of engineering 
economy based research has claimed because engineering economy based efficiency studies mostly use McKinsey 
studies(Granade, Creyts, Derkach, & Farese, 2009) for supply curve of efficiency technologies. Neo-classical 
economists are skeptical about whether McKinsey report accounted for all relevant costs (Gillingham & Palmer, 
2013). 
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barriers to improving the energy-efficiency gap. A market failure is something inherent in the 
market that causes the market’s allocation of resources to be inefficient. Market failures include 
asymmetric information, non-competitive markets, and externalities and public goods. On the 
other hand, non-market failure refers to the reason why the observed behavior is optimal from 
the point of view of energy users. Non-market failure accounts for uncertainty about future 
energy prices. These factors can create the energy-efficiency gap for both energy-efficient 
technology producers and consumers. 
1.2 Policy Instruments 
Several policy instruments can be implemented to close energy-efficiency gaps (Linares 
& Labandeira, 2010). First, governments can implement taxes or subsidies to affect the behavior 
of consumers and firms. Technology standards that set minimum energy efficiency requirements 
for products can be used as another way to close the energy-efficiency gap. Second, economists 
prefer to implement market-based environmental policies, such as tradable permits, because 
market-based approaches are theoretically more cost-effective than command-and-control 
approaches. Economists have long preferred the market-based approach over regulatory 
approaches to reduce carbon emissions for economic efficiency (Chen & Tseng, 2011). Third, 
voluntary information-labeling policies can be cost effective and may resolve some market 
failures. 
Conventionally, the United States has used the command-and-control approach to 
manage environmental pollutants. The command-and-control approach forces firms to reduce 
pollution outputs to a certain point regardless of costs (Stavins, 2007). For example, regulations 
require the installation of pollution-control equipment, and put limits on the number of pollutants 
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produced from manufacturing factories. In addition, Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) is a 
regulatory policy that requires increased energy production from renewable sources. The RPS 
mechanism places an obligation on electricity supply companies to produce a specified 
percentage of their electricity from renewable energies (Metcalf, 2009). In the household 
appliance market, for example, the purpose of the minimum energy-efficiency standard is to 
remove less efficient products from the market so that overall energy efficiency of products will 
improve; this has been evaluated as a quite successful policy instrument. 
The biggest advantage of the command-and-control approach is that monitoring is easy. 
Since a regulator directly specifies the allowable level of pollutants, the only thing the regulator 
needs to do is verify whether firms meet the environmental goals. However, command-and-
control has disadvantages as well. First, it is costly to monitor every individual polluting source. 
Second, it lacks leeway in achieving equal marginal control costs, which makes the policy 
expensive to enforce. 
Information programs also play a significant role in closing the energy-efficiency gap. In 
the household appliance market, ENERGY STAR is an energy-efficiency program that provides 
information to consumers and firms regarding energy-efficient technologies. The provision of 
information could mitigate inefficiencies that arise in an asymmetric information market 
(Akerlof, 1970). In other words, the role of ENERGY STAR is to help consumers identify more 
energy-efficient products thereby inducing behavioral changes. The program asks the sellers of 
highly energy-efficient products to indicate to consumers the quality of their products. With this 
information, consumers can select highly energy-efficient products instead of products that are 
not energy efficient. 
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1.3 Energy Innovation and Energy-efficiency Gap 
What is the role of policy in promoting technological innovation to close energy-
efficiency gap? Well-designed energy policies can lead to technological innovation. Existing 
research provides evidence to support this argument. Several scholars (Jaffe & Palmer, 1997; 
Brunnermeier & Cohen, 2003; Kneller & Manderson, 2012) found a positive relationship 
between environmental policy and innovation. Building on Jaffe and Palmer (1997), 
environmental economists took advantage of econometric techniques to estimate the impact of 
various factors on energy innovation (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2002; Altwies & Nemet, 2013; 
Carrión-Flores et al., 2013; Carrión-Flores & Innes, 2010; Keith Brouhle et al., 2013; Jaffe & 
Palmer, 1997; Lanjouw & Mody, 1996; Brunnermeier & Cohen, 2003; Popp, 2006; Popp, 2005; 
Horbach, 2008; Horbach, Rammer, & Rennings, 2012; Popp, 2002). Well-designed energy 
policy leads to technological innovation while poorly designed energy policy inhibits innovation 
(Managi, Opaluch, Jin, & Grigalunas, 2004).  
Academic literature on innovation indicated that several determinants give rise to 
innovation. Schumpeter's (1934) seminal paper discussed the idea of the size of firms and the 
market. His ideas influenced subsequent literature, and he argued that the creation of new 
inventions is pushed through research and development. Additionally, Schmookler (1962) 
asserted that demand incentivizes innovation. There is a distinction between demand-pull and 
technology-push arguments as determinants of innovations. Demand pull focuses on the role of 
consumers while technology push refers to the idea that a new invention is pushed through 
research and development (Jaffe & Palmer, 1997; Peters, Schneider, Griesshaber, & Hoffmann, 
2012; Costantini, Crespi, Martini, & Pennacchio, 2015). Recently, researchers also argued that 
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appropriability, the ability to control and exploit the benefits from innovation, is one of the key 
drivers of innovation. Furthermore, higher energy prices are a crucial factor in stimulating 
energy innovation, ceteris paribus, which is known as “Hicks’ induced innovation hypothesis” 
(Hicks, 1932).2  
Development of energy-efficient technologies can be a promising solution for closing 
energy-efficiency gap. However, these technologies appear not to be adopted by consumers to a 
degree that would sufficiently close the gap. Economists have also put a lot of effort to 
identifying factors that drive or hinder the adoption of energy-efficient products by consumers. 
In this dissertation, while the first two essays are related to the relationship between policy and 
energy-efficient technology producers, the third essay is about identifying factors that affect the 
adoption of energy-efficient products by consumers. 
1.4 The First Essay 
The objective of the first essay is to examine the impact of energy-efficiency policy on 
innovation in household appliance firms. Firms must meet the minimum federal standards 
dictated by the National Appliance Energy Conservation Act (NAECA) in order to sell their 
products. Furthermore, ENERGY STAR was created in 1992 and assists firms that invest in 
energy-efficient products, thereby promoting energy-product diffusion to consumers. Figure 1 
shows the development of average household refrigerator energy use, volume, and price over 
time. 
                                                 
2 For an empirical analysis, Newell, Jaffe, and Stavins (1999) developed a methodology for testing the hypothesis by 
estimating a product characteristic of household appliances. 
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Figure 1. Average Household Refrigerator Energy Use, Volume, and Price over time3  
Firms have incentives to participate in voluntary environmental regulations in order to 
avoid more stringent regulation from the government. Some firms have gone above and beyond 
the threshold of voluntary standards while others barely satisfy the minimum requirement; both 
reactions send a signal to consumers and the government. When firms achieve the requirements 
for ENERGY STAR certification, they can raise their prices in order to maximize their profits. 
However, there is a dearth of research on the relationship between energy-efficiency policy and 
innovation across firms. Therefore, this chapter investigates why firms participates in voluntary 
                                                 
3 http://www.aceee.org/blog/2014/09/how-your-refrigerator-has-kept-its-co 
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environmental programs and what is firms’ patenting behavior in response to energy-efficiency 
policy changes. 
From a program evaluation perspective, is a voluntary approach an effective 
environmental policy instrument? Initially, scholars were interested in the reason why firms 
participate in voluntary environmental policy (Arora & Cason, 1996). Numerous researchers 
empirically studied the effectiveness of voluntary programs (B. Howarth, Haddad, & Paton, 
2000; Khanna, Khanna, Damon, & Damon, 1999; Pizer, Morgenstern, & Shih, 2008; Bui & 
Kapon, 2012; Bae, Wilcoxen, & Popp, 2010; Cutter & Neidell, 2009; Kotchen, 2013; 
Morgenstern & Pizer, 2007). A recent theoretical work by Mason (2013) shows that it is still 
uncertain whether voluntary labeling programs are an effective policy. This is partly because 
complications arise when bounded rational consumers, strategic companies, and the government 
work against each other. Brouhle and Khanna (2006) showed that increasing awareness among 
consumers of the quality of a product can increase the quality of products, but it could also result 
in too much product differentiation. Scholars have also shown interest in evaluating the impact 
of voluntary environmental policy on innovation using patent data (Keith Brouhle, Graham, & 
Harrington, 2013; Carrión-Flores, Innes, & Sam, 2013a). For example, Keith Brouhle et al.  
(2013) find evidence that the Climate Wise Program positively lead to environmental patenting. 
On the other hand, Carrión-Flores, Innes, and Sam (2013b) show that 33/50 voluntary programs 
deter future environmental technological innovation. Therefore, there is no consensus among 
researchers regarding the impact of voluntary environmental program on innovation. 
1.5 The Second Essay 
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Both the characteristics of policies and the country-level policy are important factors 
affecting technological innovation. In the second essay, we use global patent data to investigate 
how countries’ lighting innovation activities respond to domestic or foreign mandatory energy-
efficiency policies. 
The raw technology for compact fluorescent light (CFL) bulbs and light-emitting diode 
(LED) bulbs was developed more than 10 years ago, but it was crude; moreover, conventional 
incandescent light bulbs attracted more consumers and, therefore, producers had incentives to 
produce more incandescent light bulbs in the market. To increase the innovation and diffusion of 
more energy-efficient lighting technologies, a policy driver was required to move forward. 
Both domestic and foreign energy efficiency policies can affect CFL and LED 
advancement. Even though the impact of foreign energy policy is relatively small compared to 
the mandatory domestic energy policy, it is anticipated that we cannot underestimate the 
effectiveness of foreign environmental policy on innovation. 
Furthermore, this chapter investigates the role of policy uncertainty on innovation. 
Because policy uncertainty discourages innovation, it is expected that domestic policy 
uncertainty negatively affects domestic patenting.  
1.6 The Third Essay 
Even though firms produce energy-efficient products, it is now the consumers’ decision 
to adopt and use energy-efficient products. From the perspective of consumers, rational 
consumers take numerous attributes of a product into consideration when they go shopping for 
energy-related durable goods. They will choose a product based on different features: brand 
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name, price, durability, and energy efficiency. While energy efficiency is not usually a priority 
when choosing a product, it can be a feature used for evaluations in consumer product reviews. 
Consider the following example involving light bulbs. Although policy spurs the innovation of 
products, causing firms to produce more energy-efficient CFLs and LEDs, their popularity is up 
to the consumers. Barriers can include technical and consumer barriers. U.S. residents were slow 
to adopt CFLs. Beginning in the late 1980s, utilities engaged in demand-side management to 
increase consumer adoption of CFLs but faced technical difficulties. In the late 1980s and early 
1990s, CFLs were bulky and their light performance was not good compared to incandescent 
light bulbs. Therefore, consumers disregarded the innovative technology and tended not to buy 
expensive CFLs rather than low-cost incandescent light bulbs. 
A rational consumer should purchase more cost-effective light bulbs. However, most of 
us are not rational but rather bounded rational. The notion of “bounded rationality” is useful to 
explain the slow dissemination of CFL and LED technologies. The term was coined by Simon 
(1985). He claimed that an economic man uses heuristics to make decisions instead of finding an 
optimal solution. Simon assumed that, because people are bounded rational rather than naturally 
rational, individuals can only focus on one or a few things at a time. Thus, people look for 
satisfactory choices rather than optimized solutions using heuristics (e.g., a rule of thumb). In 
this regard, bounded rational consumers tend to underestimate the long-term benefits of more 
energy-efficient technologies due to their high up-front costs. Therefore, the policy discussion of 
how to better design energy-guide labeling and the ENERGY STAR program is relevant to 
understanding how to better educate bounded rational consumers. Additionally, utilities provide 
a rebate if consumers purchase LED bulbs, thus making them more attractive to consumers. 
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Utilities have also sponsored programs intended to drive consumers to buy CFLs, and retailers 
have provided rebate and coupon programs. 
Unlike the price of electricity, gasoline price is more salient to consumers. Since the 
1970s, many economists have examined the impact of gasoline prices on the demand for 
automobiles. Most found that higher gasoline prices lead to increased demand for smaller, more 
fuel-efficient cars, especially if higher gasoline prices are sustained (Congressional Budget 
Office, 2008). The longer gasoline prices remain high, the more likely consumers are to switch to 
fuel-efficient vehicles. Li, Haefen, and Timmins (2008) showed that high gasoline prices affect 
the purchase of more fuel-efficient vehicles and speed the scrapping of less fuel-efficient 
vehicles. It appears that there is a link between gasoline price increases and the willingness of 
people to consider electric vehicles. 
In this regard, we examine what factors affect the consideration of purchasing electric 
vehicles and how consumers value the price of gasoline in terms of their willingness to purchase 
hybrid vehicles. We are particularly interested in the impact of future energy-price perception on 
the willingness to consider hybrid vehicles. It is plausible that consumers tend to form future 
gasoline price beliefs and then make a vehicle choice. Previous literature assumes no change in 
future forecast assumptions because future gasoline prices are hard to predict. In this chapter, we 
test the question of future beliefs are better indicators of consumers’ willingness to buy hybrid or 
plug-in hybrid vehicles. 
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CHAPTER 2. INNOVATION UNDER THE ENERGY STAR 
PROGRAM 
2.1 Introduction 
What role do voluntary environmental policies play in determining firms’ innovation? 
The impact that such policies have on innovation is ambiguous because of two opposing effects: 
signaling and innovation. The signaling effect of a voluntary environmental policy hinders 
innovation because firms send signals to the government that they anticipate loose environmental 
policies in the future; they are thus less likely to innovate. Even though a voluntary 
environmental policy is less stringent than a mandatory environmental policy, firms may find 
ways to improve the energy efficiency of their products or use less energy to make those 
products. Depending on the relative sizes of the two effects, participating in the voluntary 
environmental program may or not lead to technological innovation. It is empirically challenging 
to tease out these two effects. 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the net effects that ENERGY STAR 
participation has had on household appliance firms’ innovation behaviors using patent data. We 
examine why firms participate in the ENERGY STAR program, and which of the participating 
firms is actively innovating. The ENERGY STAR program can be complementary or 
substitutionary to mandatory energy-efficiency mandates that create incentives for firms to make 
innovations in energy efficiency. 
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The first objective of this chapter is that product innovation in the household appliance 
industry has been relatively understudied. Numerous researchers have paid attention to the 
consumer side of ENERGY STAR, but relatively few studies have examined regarding the 
manufacturer side of product innovation. Taylor, Fujita, and Dale (2012) conducted a pilot study 
on the dynamics of innovation and energy efficiency policies. They described the general 
relationship between the rate and direction of technological change in the household appliance 
industry. Their paper focused on several leading firms (Maytag, Electrolux, Whirlpool, and 
General Electric) because those firms have dominated the household appliance market. However, 
a limitation arises from their neglect of other firms’ patenting behaviors. In this paper, we seek to 
fill that gap. 
The second objective of this paper is to provide evidence of the relationship between 
voluntary environmental programs and technological innovation. A body of literature examines 
the relationship between energy policy and innovation. Building on Jaffe and Palmer (1997), 
scholars have taken advantage of the econometric technique to estimate the impacts of various 
factors on energy innovation (Altwies & Nemet, 2013; Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2002). 
Particularly, most of the literature relies on R&D expenditures or patent data to assess this 
relationship. Jaffe and Palmer's (1997) seminal study investigates the relationship between total 
R&D expenditures (or the number of patent applications) and pollution abatement costs. 
Subsequently, numerous studies have found a positive relationship between innovation and 
environmental regulation (Arimura, Hibiki, & Katayama, 2008; Brunnermeier & Cohen, 2003; 
Lanoie et al., 2011; Popp, 2003, 2006b). One study emphasizes the negative relationship between 
environmental regulation and innovation; for example, the increased age of capital in U.S. 
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electric utilities in the 1970s (Nelson, Tietenberg, & Donihue, 1993). However, their study is not 
considered to be properly designed as a regulation that would encourage innovation.  
In general, findings on the effectiveness of voluntary environmental programs are mixed. 
Innes and Sam (2008) found that the effectiveness of the 33/50 program4 only lasted for the first 
year of the program. Carrión-Flores, Innes, and Sam (2013) even argue that the 33/50 program 
deters future innovation. However, it is possible for firms to learn better technological options by 
participating in voluntary environmental programs. Contary to other voluntary environmental 
programs, ENERGY STAR program is generally considered to be a stringent program, and it 
appears to be an effective voluntary program (Fischer & Lyon, 2014). After becoming an 
ENERGY STAR partner5, a firm agrees to measure and track energy usage, implement energy 
performance strategies, and further educate staff and the public about its achievement. It could be 
the case that ENERGY STAR may spur the innovation of ENERGY STAR partners. Since the 
ENERGY STAR program expanded to include refrigerators in 1997, numerous firms have 
started to become ENERGY STAR partners, which may positively affect the patenting behavior 
of household appliance firms, especially ENERGY STAR participating firms. 
Previous literature6 emphasized that the decision to participate in a voluntary program is 
random and there is no systematic difference between the treatment group and control group 
(Khanna & Damon, 1999). If we use a traditional difference-in-differences estimation method to 
tease out the impact of the ENERGY STAR on innovation, endogenous problems could arise. To 
avoid this, Pizer, Morgenstern, and Shih (2008) used a difference-in-differences estimation and 
                                                 
4 The 33/50 program was the EPA’s first effort to reduce pollution by regulated firms initiated in 1991. 
5 https://www.energystar.gov/buildings/about-us/become-energy-star-partner 
6 For reviews of this literature, see Lyon and Maxwell (2002) and Morgenstern and Pizer (2007). 
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propensity score matching technique where there is no selection bias on unobserved 
characteristics. This method allows for overcoming observed differences between participants 
and non-participants. 
Due to there being a relatively small number of firms7, we employ a two-stage estimation 
approach instead of using difference-in-difference and propensity score matching techniques. In 
a nutshell, we find suggestive evidence of the impact of ENERGY STAR program on household 
appliance patenting. Unlike other no-significant results of the effectiveness of the other programs 
in the previous literature, it is attributed to the minimum energy efficiency standard which may 
kick unqualified products out of the market and push technology frontiers.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we provide the historical background 
of energy policy related to household appliances. Second, we describe the theoretical argument 
and literature review. Third, we estimate and discuss the results of the impact of ENERGY 
STAR on innovation using a two-stage model: a participating equation and patenting equation. 
Finally, we discuss the implications and then conclude. 
2.2 Background 
The energy crisis in the 1970s led to the implementation of energy efficiency standards. 
States such as California, Massachusetts, and New York led the way. For example, California 
passed legislation to create energy efficiency standards for refrigerators in 1978 (ACEEE, 2014). 
The California Energy Commission subsequently updated these standards in 1980 and 1987. As 
                                                 
7 We identify firms using patent data. Someone might argue that using NAICS codes would be more appropriate to identify 
relevant firms, but it raises the issue of low matching ratios among patent data, NAICS codes, and COMPUSTAT. So we use 
NBER patent data to discern relevant firms. 
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a consequence, the annual energy consumption of refrigerators in the state gradually decreased. 
However, states had different types of regulations, and companies did not want to comply with 
various regulations. Therefore, companies called for a unified federal standard (Lester & Hart, 
2012). California’s success provided the impetus for the implementation of federal energy 
efficiency standards. In 1987, President Reagan signed national legislation to finalize the federal 
standards for products. Following that, the Department of Energy updated the federal standards 
for refrigerators in 1990, 1993, 2001, and 2014. 
The Federal Trade Commission required companies to add Energy Guide labels on their 
household appliances to inform consumers of the estimated annual operating costs of those 
products. These estimates were based on the national average price of electricity. Federal 
standards varied depending on the configuration and the size of the refrigerator. 
The federal energy efficiency standards spurred firms’ product innovations because firms 
had to satisfy the requirements. Levine, Koomey, McMahon, Sanstad, and Hirst (1995) showed 
that the net benefit of the federal minimum energy efficiency standards enacted in 1994 was 
about $45 billion. Companies challenged themselves to develop technologies with greater energy 
efficiency—including better insulation, more efficient compressors, and improved heat 
exchangers. For these reasons, experts have viewed these regulatory policies as some of the most 
successful energy efficiency policies (Brown, 2001). 
To promote the diffusion of energy-efficient products and assist companies that were 
investing in such products, ENERGY STAR was created in 1992. ENERGY STAR is a 
voluntary program that provides information about energy-efficient technologies to consumers 
and companies; the program thereby corrects the informational asymmetry between firms and 
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consumers. Sellers with highly energy-efficient products are asked to indicate the quality of their 
products to consumers through this program. Thus, informed consumers can select these highly 
energy-efficient products instead of less efficient products by looking for the ENERGY STAR 
logo on a product’s label. This program is successful in reducing energy consumption and 
greenhouse gas emissions (Sanchez, Brown, Webber, & Homan, 2008). Joiner & Laux (2008) 
find that ENERGY STAR partner firms have a competitive advantage compared to non-
ENERGY STAR partners. 
ENERGY STAR includes household and commercial appliances, such as air 
conditioners, heat pumps, and refrigerators. Several revisions have been made to the ENERGY 
STAR criteria for refrigerators since 1992. On January 1, 2003, all refrigerators and freezers 
greater than 7.75 cubic feet in volume were required to be 10% more energy efficient than the 
minimum federal standard to be ENERGY STAR certified. Products less than 7.75 cubic feet in 
volume had to be at least 20% above the federal minimum standard to receive the certification. 
In 2004, the criteria for full-sized refrigerators rose to 15% in 2004 and to 20% more in 2008. 
The latter version of the standard (version 4.1), remained in effect until September 15, 2014, 8  
when the new ENERGY STAR criteria for residential refrigerators took effect. Table 1 




                                                 
8 http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=refrig.pr_crit_refrigerators 
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Table 1. Energy policies that may impact innovation of household appliance firms9 
Year Events 
1990 First federal refrigerator efficiency standards enacted 
1992 Energy Policy Act signed; EPA ENERGY STAR program is created 
1993 
Federal refrigerator standards are updated; Super-Efficient Refrigerator 
Program(SERP) Golden Carrot strategy announced 
1997 EPA/DOE Energy Star program expanded to include refrigerators 
2001 Federal refrigerator efficiency standards are updated 
2007 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) signed; requires DOE 
final rule on 2014 refrigerators by end of 2010 
In the household appliance market, firms strategically compete to maximize profits and 
increase market share. Increasing the number of households with energy-efficient products will, 
over time, reduce overall household energy consumption. As a result, households will spend less 
on energy, allowing them to spend more on other goods and services. From the firms’ viewpoint, 
they will incur upfront costs to improve the energy efficiency of their products and thus lose 
short-term profits. However, firms can increase their long-term profits by selling a greater 
volume. Economic theory indicates that a firm strategically determines the price of its products 
to maximize profits. Houde (2014) used product-level transactional data from the U.S. 
refrigerator market to demonstrate that firms clustered their performance around the certification 
requirement and thereby maximized their profits. Houde (2014) conducted a welfare analysis of 
ENERGY STAR, but he did not address the relationship between environmental policy and 
innovation which is underexplored. 
                                                 
9
 Source: Department of Energy, 2010; Deumling, 2009; Taylor, 1995  
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Economic theory indicates that a club members share a common value and enjoy benefits 
after joining voluntary programs excluding non-club members (Buchanan, 1965; Kotchen, 
2012). Once a firm participates in the program, a firm decides whether to continuously introduce 
ENERGY STAR products or to shirk rules on ENERGY STAR, depending on enforcement and 
monitoring mechanisms (Prakash & Potoski, 2006) and a firm’s resources (Hart, 1995). 
Since the United States is a big market, both domestic and foreign firms have an 
incentive to file a patent application. For example, firms must meet the minimum federal 
standards dictated by the National Appliance Energy Conservation Act (NAECA) to sell their 
products in the United States. Additionally, firms have incentives to participate in voluntary 
environmental regulations in order to send signals to both consumers and the government. Firms 
hope to sell more products by sending a green signal to consumers. This is called the signaling 
effect. Firms may hope to escape more stringent regulation from the government by sending 
earlier signals. Or a firm may have an incentive to innovate in order to satisfy the threshold of 
voluntary standards or even more. It is therefore possible for U.S. and foreign companies to act 
differently in order to meet the ENERGY STAR program. For example, foreign companies are 
more likely to make products higher than their minimum standards. The reason why foreign 
firms exceed ENERGY STAR standards can be explained by high transaction costs: high 
processing fees, a risk of ENERGY STAR certification rejection, and change in policy 
uncertainty. Here we expect to see a differential impact of the policy on domestic or foreign firm 
innovation. 
2.3 Methods 
2.3.1 Model Specifications 
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Building on Brouhle, Graham, and Harrington (2013)’s model specification, we construct 
a two-stage model to estimate the impact of ENERGY STAR on innovation. Ideally, we should 
account for unobserved heterogeneity, find time-varying instruments, and use a fixed effect 
Negative Binomial estimator. 
First, we construct a firm participation equation. If a firm expects a net benefit, a firm 
would participate in the ENERGY STAR program. This equation specifies factors that are 
expected to affect a firm participation in the ENERGY STAR program. Similar to Brouhle, 
Graham, and Harrington (2013)’s model, we model a firm’s net benefit of participation in the 
ENERGY STAR as follows:  
 Di,t
∗ =  β1X1i.t  +  εi,t (1) 
where Di,t is a firm’s net benefit for firm i in year t, X1i,t is a vector of independent 
variables for firm i in year t. β is a vector of parameters we estimate, and εi,t is residuals. Table 2 
shows a list of dependent and independent variables. Since we cannot measure net benefits of 
participating, we proxy this with a binary participation decision.  
 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
∗ > 0 
   =0 otherwise 
(2) 
It reduces to the form and we estimate it using a logit model. 
 Di,t =  F(β1X1i.t)  +  ui,t (3) 
A firm-level patenting equation is as follow: 
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 Yi,t = αDi,t + β2X2i,t  +  ε2i,t (4) 
Where Yi,t is energy-related household appliance patents by a firm 𝑖 and year 𝑡, Di,t is a 
participation in the ENERGY STAR program, X2i,t is a vector of exogenous variables, ε2i,t is 
random errors.  
There might be an endogenous problem in equation (4) even after controlling for fixed 
effects. For example, we could have unobserved factors that affect both a participation decision 
and a patenting decision. Firms with higher patent propensity are more likely to participate in 
ENERGY STAR Program, i.e., a sample selection bias can occur. So, we conduct a Hausman 
test for endegeneity10 and there are some omitted variables biases in the regression. 
In order to overcome the potential endogenous problem in the equation, we follow two 
approaches addressed in Brouhle et al., (2013). The first approach is to control for unobserved 
time invariant effect by using fixed effect panel model estimation. This overcomes the potential 
unobserved heterogeneous effects across firms. For example, “green” managers, engineers, or 
lawyers may affect both the decision to participate in the ENERGY STAR program and the 
patenting equation. Early participants in ENERGY STAR partners and late participants in 
ENERGY STAR partners may behave differently.  
The second approach is to control for an unobserved time variant effect by using an 
instrumental variable. In this chapter, participation in the Green Light program11, which was a 
precedent of the ENERGY STAR program, may affect the decision to participate in the 
                                                 
10  Prob > chi2 =    0.0348 
11 The Green Light Program was later integrated into ENERGY STAR. 
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ENERGY STAR program but may not affect energy-related household appliance patents. Since 
the purpose of the Green Light program is to encourage firms or organizations to install energy-
efficient technologies, the motivation for a firm to develop innovative energy-related household 
appliance technology is weak. The rationale for the valid instrumental variable is that the Green 
Light program is not intended to encourage energy-related household appliance patents directly, 
but through participation in the ENERGY STAR program. In order to check the validity of the 
instrument variable12, we conduct an F-test on the instrument to see if the instrument is jointly 
significant in the endogenous variable (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010).13 We find that a participation 
in the Green Light program is a significant predictor of participation in the ENERGY STAR 
program. 
Because the number of patents is a dependent variable, we employ a Poisson model and 
use a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. As we detect an over-dispersion 
problem in the count model, we prefer to use a negative binomial model. However, a negative 
binomial model cannot adequately account for the endogeneity issue in this paper, so our main 
estimation is an IV Poisson model with fixed effects and to check the robustness of the models 
using a negative binomial model. 
 
 
                                                 
12 An alternative instrument variable might be brand name book values (advertising expenditure/bookvalue of the firm) (Wang, 
2013). However, it does not pass the F-test. 
13 Conditional estimator is always safe when T < 20 a unconditional estimator has a negligible amount of bias for 16 ≤ T < 20. 
The bias in the unconditional estimator grows as T decreases (Couṕ, 2005). Since T=14, we also use conditional logit fixed effect 
model to check the robustness of the instrumental variable by allowing for clustered by industry-robust standard errors. In this 
case, the Chi2 statistics is 109.05. 
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Table 2. A list of variables 





Dependent variables        
ES_year 345 0.17 0.38 0 1 X  
No. of patents(by year and 
firm) 345 3.13 5.04 0 30  X 
Independent variables        
greenlight 345 0.24 0.43 0 1 X  
ROA-Return on Assets=net 
income/total assets 343 5.16 7.05 -26.42 32.31  X 
DTA-debt to assets 343 0.15 0.09 0 0.45  X 
employee: three-year moving 
average 309 4.01 1.83 -1.41 6.64 X X 
Capital expenditure: log of the 
average of a firm's past three 
years capital expenditure 320 6.12 2.29 -1.41 10.37 X X 
R&D expenditure: log of the 
average of a firm's past three 
years expenditure 312 5.66 2.31 -2.50 9.05 X X 
Beverage and Tobacco 
Product Manufacturing 345 0.04 0.20 0 1  X 
Chemical Manufacturing 345 0.23 0.42 0 1  X 
Machinery Manufacturing 345 0.08 0.27 0 1  X 
Computer and Electronic 
Product Manufacturing 345 0.22 0.42 0 1  X 
Electrical Equipment, 
Appliance, and Component 
Manufacturing 345 0.20 0.40 0 1  X 
Transportation Equipment 
Manufacturing 345 0.14 0.35 0 1  X 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 345 0.01 0.12 0 1  X 
Others 345 0.07 0.25 0 1  X 
Germany 345 0.05 0.21 0 1  X 
Italy 345 0.03 0.16 0 1  X 
Japan 345 0.24 0.43 0 1  X 
South Korea 345 0.03 0.18 0 1  X 
United Kingdom 345 0.05 0.22 0 1  X 
New Zealand 345 0.01 0.12 0 1  X 
Switzerland 345 0.04 0.20 0 1  X 
United States 345 0.54 0.50 0 1  X 
Notes:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
1. The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 2002                      
2. We also use one-year and two-year lags to check the robustness of the models. 
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2.3.2 Construction of data 
Patent counts are frequently used as a measure of innovation. Of course, not all firms 
decide to patent their innovations (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000), and thus patent counts are 
not a perfect measure of energy innovation output.17 However, they are generally considered one 
of the best energy innovation outputs. 
Previously, Taylor, Fujita, Dale, and McMahon (2012) identified energy-efficient patents 
related to refrigerator using U.S. Patent Classification (USPC) and four major players including 
mergers and acquisitions: General Electric, Whirlpool, Electrolux, and Maytag. They identified 
64 energy-related patents for refrigerators between 1976 and January 17, 2011, out of a total of 
1,060 refrigerator patents. There are two possible caveats to this search method. It may omit 
relevant patents filed by small firms, and therefore we consider their results to be an under 
representation of the entire scope of refrigeration innovation. More broadly18, to better define 
energy-efficient technological developments in household appliances, we also refer to the recent 
two level keywords search methods (Barbieri & Palma, 2016).  
In this paper, we combine two papers’ method which has a broader scope than the four 
major manufacturers.19 We collected the patent data to analyze firm innovation behaviors related 
                                                 
17 A discussion of the relationship between patent data and energy innovation output is well documented in  Popp (2005)’s paper. 
18 An alternative way to identify firms is to use Euromonitor Passport database, a global market information database, but the 
database does not include non-brand firms. Thus, we rely on the two level keywords search methods to identify relevant firms. 
19 Barbieri and Palma (2016) 
First-level keywords: (((energysav$ OR energy efficien$ OR energy conservation  OR high efficien$ OR low energy 
OR low-energy  OR low electricity consumption OR energy reduction  OR energy economis$ OR energy 
economiz$ OR energy  performanc$ OR less electric energy OR less electricity  OR less energy OR energy use 
manage$ OR energy AND  use control$ OR energy manage$) AND (residen$ OR hous$  OR domestic OR hom$ OR 
dwellin$ OR famil$)).TIAB.)-->399 
 
Second-level keywords: (refrigerator OR refrigerators OR fridge OR fridges OR washingmachine$ OR 
dishwash$).TIAB.  -> 5344 
Taylor, Fujita, and Dale (2013)   
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to refrigerator energy efficiency gathered from the CASSIS20 (USPTO) and matched with 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) patent database21 (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 
2001) using patent number. Additionally, we match patent data with COMPUSTAT’s financial 
information using a Global Company Key (GVKEY).22 We can identify firms using NAICS 
codes, but one concern is that we may not obtain enough control variables. 
We matched the retrieved patents to the ENERGY STAR partner list. 23 It is assumed that 
the ENERGY STAR partner list is the most up-to-date proxy for ENERGY STAR participating 
firms. One caveat of this database is that we could not distinguish the participating year of the 
firm, so we manaully found the year of firm participation, which is shown in Table 5. In 
addition, data on Green Light participating firms24 was found in the Environment Protection 
Agency (EPA)’s Green Lights Annual Reports. 
It is not a complete list of ENERGY STAR participants over the course of the years 
because a firm can go in and out of the ENERGY STAR program. For simplicity of analysis, we 
ruled out this possibility. We assume that ENERGY STAR partner does not withdraw its 
membership because a firm can maintain its membership as long it has at least one eligible 
                                                 
((energy AND efficiency) OR (appliance) OR (household) OR (refrigerator) OR (cooler)) AND (62/$)).CCLS. ----
>3220 
20 CASSIS is a stand-alone machine that includes US Patent and Trademark Office database (Utility patents: Jan, 1969 to Apr, 
2010). 
21 https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/downloads 




24 Green Light participating firms: 501 KK Toshiba, Amana Refrigeration Inc, Carrier Corporation, Coca Cola Botting Works Co, 
Gen Electric Co, Maytag Co, and Whirlpool Corp. 
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product. If a household appliance does not satisfy ENERGY STAR requirements, a certification 
body (CB) reports to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and shares with other CBs 
through an internal account which is not publicly available on the ENERGY STAR website. 
Once again, even though one product may be disqualifed over the course of years, it does not 
necessarily mean that a firm discontinues its ENERGY STAR partnership. So, our assumption is 
valid.  
We dropped any firm that had less than 5 patents from the sample.26 This resulted in 
1,311 patents, including 444 patents by ENERGY STAR participating firms and 867 patents by 
non-ENERGY STAR participating firms. Figure 2 illustrates the number of energy-related and 
non-energy-related household appliance patent applications. 
 
Figure 2. Number of Patent Applications by ENERGY STAR/non-ENERGY STAR firms 
                                                 








1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
No. of Patents by ES vs. Non-ES
non-ES ES
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To identify where R&D occurred, we used the location information of the assignee. 
Figure 3 shows the number of patent applications by the assignee’s country of origin from 1990 
to 2003. United States inventors accounted for about 56% of total patent applications. South 
Korean inventors accounted for 22%, followed by Japanese inventors. 
 
Figure 3. Number of patents by assignee’s country of origin 
The identification of year of participating in Green Light program comes from the Green 
Light program reports from 199227 to 1996. Each year, a report introduces a new member. A 
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sample of the report’s front page is attached in . We manually identify a list of firms and year of 
participation.28  
 Table 2 shows variables used in both the participation equation and the patenting 
equation. Once again, we use the number of patents by a firm each year. In the ENERGY STAR 
participation equation, an instrumental variable is Green Light29, which is a binary variable that 
indicates whether a firm participated in the Green Light program.  
2.3.3 A Participation Equation 
 In a participation equation, DeCanio and Watkins (1998) addressed several factors that 
affect the decision of firms to participate in the Green Light program: large firms, higher 
earnings/share and higher price/earnings. Therefore, we include in the model the number of 
employees and firm financial information: Return on Assets and Debt to Assets. Koehler (2007) 
pointed out several factors influencing participation in voluntary environmental program: final 
goods producers, consumer pressure, and higher advertising expenditures per unit sales. Several 
other variables can be included, but we do not include them in models because most ENERGY 
STAR partners are final goods producers as well. It is also not easy to obtain entire advertising 
expenditures for companies over the course of years. 
2.3.4 A Patenting Equation 
                                                 
28 Green light participating firms in 1992: 501 KK TOSHIBA, AMANA REFRIGERATION INC, CARRIER CORORATION, 
COCA COLA BOTTLING WORKS CO, GEN ELECTRIC CO, MAYTAG CO, and WHIRLPOOL CORP 
29 Howarth, R. B., Haddad, B. M., and Paton (2004) showed that over 2,300 organizations participated in the Green Light 
program and they achieved about 40 percent energy reduction. 
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In a patenting equation, firm-level financial information is included in my model to 
measure firm profitability and uncertainty. Return on Assets, which is net income divided by 
total assets, is a measure of resource availability of a firm (Russo & Fouts, 1997). Debt to assets 
is a measure of financial risk (Arora & Cason, 1995). Much previous literature emphasized the 
significance of a firm’s technical capacity on maximizing energy efficiency of firms (Matisoff, 
2010; Stafford, 2012). Since capital intensive firms are more likely to file patent applications 
(Carrión-Flores & Innes, 2010), we include capital expenditure, which is measured by the log of 
the average of a firm's capital expenditure for the past three years, normalized by the average of 
number of employees for the past three years. We also include R&D expenditure which is 
measured by the log of the average of a firm's past three years’ R&D expenditure, normalized by 
the average of number of employees for the past three years. Since capital and R&D 
expenditures are highly correlated, we do not both include in the model. We separately include 
the variable interchangeably to check the robustness of the model. 
Finally, we have several control variables. We include a three year moving average of the 
number of employees to control for the size of a firm. Industries can have different incentives to 
file patent applications, and Lange (2009) argues for the importance of industries examining 
voluntary environmental programs, so we include a NAICS industry code dummy variable. 
Environmental innovation is spurred by the anticipated regulation of energy efficiency policy as 
well, so we include a year fixed effect. We also include a firm fixed effect to control for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneous effect. However, we cannot both include a year and firm 
fixed effects due to the incidental parameter problem. 
2.3.5 Main Estimations 
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In a nutshell, we first utilize the Green Light Program as an explicit instrumental variable 
to measure the impact of the ENERGY STAR program on innovation, which is our baseline 
estimation method. Second, we use a predicted value of ENERGY STAR participation as an 
instrumental variable of the patenting equation. Third, as there is an over-dispersion issue in the 
count model, we also use a negative binomial model with fixed effects to check the robustness of 
the models. Last, we also conduct several robustness checks. 
2.4 Main Estimation Results 
First, we use the IV estimation command (ivpoisson gmm)  in STATA30 to estimate the 
impact of the instrumental variable on patenting. Several papers also use the GMM estimator to 
estimate the fixed-effects Poisson model for panel data (Blundell, Griffith, & Windmeijer, 2002; 
Wooldridge, 1999; Wooldridge, 2010).  shows that a participation in the ENERGY STAR 
Program which is instrumented by the Green Light Program participation positively affects 
patenting at the 5% significance level. 
The surprising results are that none of other variables are significant except debt to asset, 
a measure of financial risk, in columns (3)-(4). In particular, we expected to see a positive sign in 
the effect of the number of employees and R&D expenditure. However, it is only statistically 
significant at the 10% level.  
 
 
                                                 
30 The standard error is already corrected (Windmeijer & Silva, 1997). 
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Table 3. Patenting equation: Green Light Program as an instrument variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES No. of Patents No. of Patents No. of Patents No. of Patents 
ES_year 1.961** 1.961** 1.961*** 1.953*** 
 (0.952) (0.953) (0.469) (0.466) 
ROA -0.00261 -0.00265 -0.00261 -0.00381 
 (0.0408) (0.0407) (0.0170) (0.0171) 
DTA 2.423 2.418 2.423** 2.470** 
 (2.272) (2.272) (1.202) (1.182) 
avgemp3years_ln 0.0969 0.0965 0.0969* 0.101* 
 (0.150) (0.150) (0.0570) (0.0577) 
avgcapx3years_ln_norm -0.000476  -0.000476 0.130 
 (0.000975)  (0.00214) (0.127) 
Elec_price -0.000606 -0.000607 -0.000606 -0.000613 
 (0.000788) (0.000789) (0.00198) (0.00198) 
avgxrd3years_ln_norm  -0.000816  -0.132 
  (0.000920)  (0.135) 
Constant -0.446 -0.443 -0.446 -0.478 
 (0.620) (0.620) (0.436) (0.431) 
     
Observations 309 309 309 309 
Notes: 
(1)-(2). Std. Err. adjusted for 8 clusters in industry 
(3)-(4). Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Second, we use a predicted value of ENERGY STAR participation as an instrumental 
variable of the patenting equation. In the participation equation, the within variation of being an 
ENERGY STAR partner is greater than the between variation31 of being an ENERGY STAR 
partner, so the standard error of the fixed effects coefficients is tolerant enough to be used in the 
patenting equation. To estimate a binary participation decision, a logit model can be consistently 
estimated with fixed effects and is preferred to a probit model in panel data structure. In the 
patenting equation, one could use a two-stage estimation method to estimate the effects of 
ENERGY STAR by including the ENERGY STAR hat from the participation equation. 
                                                 
31 The between variation of being ENERGY STAR partner is 0.24 which is less than the within variation 0.30.  
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However, the standard error would be incorrect. As a robustness check, Table 4 shows the result 
of the patenting equation. Similarly, the key finding is ENERGY STAR partners are more likely 
to innovate than non-ENERGY STAR partners. 
Table 4. Patenting equation: Energy Star hat as an instrument variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES No. of 
Patents 
lnalpha No. of 
Patents 
lnalpha No. of 
Patents 
lnalpha 
ES_hat 2.734***      
 (1.037)      
ES_hat2   2.070***    
   (0.652)    
ES_hat3     1.512***  
     (0.314)  
roa -0.0110  0.00533  -0.0492***  
 (0.0219)  (0.0200)  (0.00814)  
dta 3.289***  3.053**  -3.122  
 (0.823)  (1.300)  (2.911)  
avgemp3years_ln 0.150  0.225  -1.266***  
 (0.121)  (0.171)  (0.169)  
avgcapx3years_ln_norm -0.000543  -0.107  -1.013***  
 (0.00134)  (0.124)  (0.208)  
elecprice -0.00185  -0.00213  0.00510***  
 (0.00170)  (0.00267)  (0.00130)  
Constant -0.560 0.344 -0.318 0.282 8.437*** -1.444*** 
 (0.429) (0.336) (0.954) (0.289) (1.004) (0.214) 
YEAR FE NO  YES  NO  
FIRM FE NO  NO  YES  
Observations 309 309 187 187 112 112 
Notes: 
(1), (3), (5). Std. Err. adjusted for 8 clusters in industry 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
2.5 Robustness Checks 
As a robustness check, the appendix shows negative binomial estimation results. It shows 
consistent results while the magnitude of the coefficients is smaller than the instrumental 
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variable approach. For further robustness checks, we replace the three-year moving average of 
covariates by one-year or two-year lags: the number of employees, the average of capital 
expenditure, and the average of R&D expenditure. Both cases are consistent with the main model 
estimation results. Because three of our control variables are highly multicollinearities34, we 
remove two of them and check the robustness of our findings. The main findings are robust after 
including each of them. We also relax the number of five patents’ assumptions and found 
consistent results. 
 
2.6 Further Estimation Results 
Table 5 shows an estimation result of an instrument variable Poisson with a country and 
Energy Star interaction term. This interaction term indicates a differential impact between U.S. 
and non-U.S. companies in response to the ENERGY STAR criteria update in 1997. We could 
not find any evidence of a differential impact of domestic or foreign firms on innovation. This 
could be expected because ENERGY STAR is a flagship voluntary energy efficiency program in 
the United States, so foreign ENERGY STAR firms have also been affected by the ENERGY 
STAR criteria update. Therefore, there is no particular reason to believe that U.S. firms are more 
likely to innovate than non-US firms in response to the policy change. 
 
 
                                                 
34 Refer to the Table 8. 
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Table 5. A differential impact of domestic and foreign firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Poisson IV Poisson IV Poisson IV 
Inter_ES_US 23.50 35.43 32.39 
 (15.53) (39.16) (29.73) 
ENERGY STAR -25.58 -41.94 -38.11 
 (16.97) (45.45) (34.12) 
Return on Assets -0.0323 -0.0295 0.0147 
 (0.0464) (0.0873) (0.0507) 
Debt to Assets -1.435 -17.31 -15.15 
 (3.621) (19.11) (14.64) 
Log (3-year moving average of number of employees) 0.628   
 (0.558)   
Log (3-year moving average of capital expenditure) 0.167   
 (0.429)   
Log (3-year moving average of R&D expenditure) -0.656*   
 (0.370)   
Log (One-year lag of average of number of employees)  2.525  
  (1.708)  
Log (One-year lag of capital expenditure)  -3.818  
  (3.233)  
Log (One-year lag of R&D expenditure)  1.602  
  (1.904)  
Log (Two-year lag of average of number of employees)   3.238* 
   (1.764) 
Log (Two-year lag of capital expenditure)   -3.194 
   (2.144) 
Log (Two-year lag of R&D expenditure)   0.550 
   (0.902) 
Constant 0.281 6.751 6.544 
 (1.110) (5.772) (4.037) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES 
FIRM FE YES YES YES 
Observations 309 282 281 
Notes: 
1. Exponential mean model with endogenous regressors 
2. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6 shows an estimation result on the interaction term between the mandatory policy 
change in 2001 and ENERGY STAR partners in order to isolate the differential effect of 
ENERGY STAR and non-ENERGY STAR firms. When it came to the mandatory policy 
change, we found no evidence supporting an impact on ENERGY STAR partner firms of the 
federal refrigerator efficiency standards update in 2001. The standards update in 2001 did not 
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give ENERGY STAR participating companies more incentive to invent energy-efficient 
technologies. However, the energy efficiency standard update in 2001 gives an incentive to 
innovate to non-ENERGY STAR firms, which is the main purpose of the mandatory policy.  
One possible explanation is the crowding effects between mandatory environmental 
policy and voluntary environmental policy associated with ENERGY STAR partners. It is 
plausible that increases in energy patents in response to the voluntary environmental policy led to 
a lesser incentive to further develop energy-efficient technologies because ENERGY STAR 
firms already meet the mandatory policy criteria. It is possible that the effectiveness of the 
voluntary program may crowd out the effectiveness of the mandatory program. It is also due to 
path-dependent technological development trajectories. So, we expect to see less effect of the 
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Table 6. Interaction between ENERGY STAR and Mandatory Policy 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Poisson IV Poisson IV Poisson IV 
ENERGY STAR*Mandatory -4.598** -2.874** -2.891** 
 (1.796) (1.271) (1.186) 
Mandatory -0.330 -0.328 -0.455 
 (0.408) (0.452) (0.455) 
ENERGY STAR 5.501*** 3.547** 3.399** 
 (1.911) (1.529) (1.458) 
Return on Assets 0.00964 0.00717 0.0116 
 (0.0150) (0.0157) (0.0166) 
Debt to Assets 3.275** 2.932 2.301 
 (1.609) (2.356) (2.393) 
Log (3-year moving average of number of employees) -0.138   
 (0.179)   
Log (3-year moving average of capital expenditure) 0.196   
 (0.164)   
Log (3-year moving average of R&D expenditure) 0.142   
 (0.192)   
Log (One-year lag of average of number of employees)  0.0719  
  (0.264)  
Log (One-year lag of capital expenditure)  -0.174  
  (0.388)  
Log (One-year lag of R&D expenditure)  0.255  
  (0.261)  
Log (Two-year lag of average of number of employees)   0.346 
   (0.283) 
Log (Two-year lag of capital expenditure)   -0.273 
   (0.372) 
Log (Two-year lag of R&D expenditure)   0.120 
   (0.235) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES 
FIRM FE YES YES YES 
Constant -0.288 -0.0851 0.549 
 (0.441) (0.923) (0.902) 
Observations 309 282 281 
Notes: 
1. Exponential mean model with endogenous regressors 
2. Robust standard errors in parentheses 




This paper contributes to an understanding of whether voluntary environmental policy in 
general—and ENERGY STAR in particular—spurs or detracts from firms’ environmental 
innovation. We found a result suggestive of the impact of ENERGY STAR on household 
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appliance firm’s innovation. It shows that ENERGY STAR firms more actively participated in 
energy-related household appliance patents in response to the ENERGY STAR criteria update in 
1997. The results show strong evidence that an ENERGY STAR criteria change can spur 
innovation in household appliance firms that participate in ENERGY STAR. There is no 
differential impact between U.S. firms and non-U.S. firms. It also shows the potential evidence 
of the crowding-out effect on innovation of a mandatory environmental policy and a voluntary 
environmental policy. 
From the firms’ collective viewpoint, they will incur up-front costs to improve the energy 
efficiency of their products and thus lose short-term profits. A new energy-efficient technology 
could be worth billions of dollars, but companies must bear a considerable amount of upfront 
costs that may lead to uncertain discounted future benefits. Due to the nature of energy efficiency 
investments, firms are reluctant to invest in R&D to improve energy-efficient technologies. 
Additionally, firms’ decisions depend on their “discount rate.” As a result, energy-efficient 
technologies will be underfunded. Therefore, government interventions play a significant role in 
guaranteeing a steady supply of energy-efficient technologies in the market. According to Porter 
(1991), environmental regulation can be an incentive for technological innovation. If 
environmental regulations are properly designed, they not only result in improved environmental 
performance but also partially offset the costs of regulation. The rationale behind this mechanism 
is that a regulation can be an incentive for innovation and create progress a firm’s technical 
solutions. 
The identification of energy-related household appliance patents in this paper was 
broader than Taylor, Fujita, Dale, and McMahon’s (2012) list of patents, which was very 
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conservative. We suggest that Taylor et al.’s (2012) identified patents (64 patents between 1976 
and 2011) were the lower bound, and this study’s identified energy-related refrigerator patents 
(2,530 patents between 1985 and 2004) are the upper bound. So, we suggest that it would be 
more accurate to identify energy-related household appliance patents including emerging 
technologies at the patent office rather than ex-post methodology.36 
Similarly with Graham, Brouhle, and Ramirez (2014)’s paper, it would be necessary to 
conduct patent weighted citation analysis in order to measure information flow from the 
ENERGY STAR participants to non-participants. Previous literature such as Delmas and Keller 
(2005) argues for a free-ride effect from voluntary environmental policy participants to non-
participants. Building on the Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993)’s seminal paper, this is an 
area of future research. 
Another remaining question is whether technological innovation spurs a tightening of the 
mandatory energy efficiency policy from 2001. It is plausible that firms participating in 
ENERGY STAR are already satisfying the minimum energy efficiency requirement of the 
mandatory policy in 2001 so that ENERGY STAR firms may lobby to the government to 
strengthen the minimum criteria. ENERGY STAR firms want to further enjoy the first mover 
advantage. Compared to non-ENERGY STAR firms, future work is required to test a reverse 
causality between voluntary and mandatory environmental policy and technological innovation.  
                                                 
36 The most comprehensive approach thus far was done from the European Patent Office (EPO). 
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501 HITACHI LTD 1 5 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 2 4 8 3 
AB ELECTROLUX 1 4 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 
AMANA REFRIGERATION INC 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ECOLAB 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
FISHER & PAYKEL APPLIANCES LTD 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 5 1 0 0 
GEN ELECTRIC CO 1 4 7 17 8 11 8 7 8 2 2 16 25 5 12 
MAYTAG CO 1 3 4 3 6 3 5 4 10 10 5 6 12 29 30 
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO LTD 1 0 0 0 12 13 17 19 27 25 13 5 8 14 21 
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 0 3 8 
WHIRLPOOL CORP 1 14 8 4 20 5 7 7 14 5 9 8 12 14 16 
501 HONDA GIKEN KOGYO KK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 1 0 1 
501 KK TOSHIBA 0 6 5 4 4 5 2 2 0 2 6 3 5 3 1 
501 SHARP KK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 
ATSUSHITA ELECTRIC IND CO LTD 0 1 2 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 4 2 4 
BASE CORP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
BOSCH & SIEMENS HAUSGERAETE 
GMBH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 1 0 5 6 6 
CHUBU ELECTRIC CO INC 0 0 0 0 5 3 3 1 1 2 4 3 5 2 0 
CHURCH & DWIGHT 0 0 3 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
COCA COLA BOTTLING WORKS CO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 6 0 0 
COGATE PALMOLIVE CO 0 6 18 1 6 6 1 1 0 3 6 2 4 2 4 
ELTEK SPA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 1 0 
HAC 0 0 4 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HELIX TECH 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
ILEVER HOME & PERSONAL CARE USA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 4 3 0 
INTEE CORP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 
ISTEON GLOBAL TECH INC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 2 
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO 0 2 1 3 5 2 12 19 12 4 9 12 17 9 8 
RACKITT BENCKISER NV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 8. Number of Patents by Assignee Country 
Year DE IT JP KR NL NZ SE US Sum 
1990 0 0 13 0 0 0 4 31 48 
1991 0 0 11 0 0 0 1 48 60 
1992 0 0 8 0 0 0 3 31 42 
1993 0 0 13 12 0 0 2 47 74 
1994 0 0 12 13 0 0 1 31 57 
1995 0 0 7 17 0 0 1 34 59 
1996 1 0 7 19 0 0 1 41 69 
1997 6 0 10 27 0 3 1 46 93 
1998 0 0 8 25 0 1 2 28 64 
1999 1 0 16 13 0 0 1 33 64 
2000 0 2 10 5 6 5 0 53 81 
2001 6 3 25 8 4 1 1 79 127 
2002 6 1 26 14 3 0 1 67 118 
2003 6 0 12 21 0 0 0 84 123 
Sum 26 6 178 174 13 10 19 653 
107
9 
*DE(Germany), IT(Italy), JP(Japan), KR(South Korea), NL(Netherlands), NZ(New Zealand), SE(Sweden), US(United States) 
 
 
Table 9. Correlation Matrix 







Green Light 1      
ROA -0.0047 1     
DTA 0.0528 -0.302 1    
Avg. employee_3year 0.1388 -0.326 0.22 1   
Avg. capx_3year 0.1291 -0.201 0.1457 0.8457 1  
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Table 10. Summary Statistics (Participants vs. Non-participants) 
Variable 
ENERGY 
STAR   Non-ENERGY STAR 
Dependent variables Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
ES_year 128 0.46875 0.501 217 0 0 
No. of patents(by year and 
firm) 128 5.242188 6.7658 217 1.880184 3.058749 
Independent variables       
greenlight 128 0.46875 0.501 217 0.110599 0.31436 
ROA-Return on 
Assets=net income/total 
assets 126 3.83283 5.2818 217 5.931655 7.810504 
DTA-debt to assets 126 0.1773631 0.0808 217 0.14158 0.095713 
employee: three-year 
moving average 115 4.255179 1.3553 194 3.860609 2.042636 
Capital expenditure: log 
of the average of a firm's 
past three years capital 
expenditure 122 6.211176 1.8518 198 6.060389 2.525626 
R&D expenditure: log of 
the average of a firm's 
past three years 
expenditure 115 5.442749 1.832 197 5.780289 2.546647 
Beverage and Tobacco 
Product Manufacturing 128 0 0 217 0.064516 0.246238 
Chemical Manufacturing 128 0.109375 0.3133 217 0.304148 0.461109 
Machinery 
Manufacturing 128 0 0 217 0.129032 0.336011 
Computer and Electronic 




Manufacturing 128 0.328125 0.4714 217 0.129032 0.336011 
Transportation 
Equipment 
Manufacturing 128 0.109375 0.3133 217 0.156682 0.364341 
Miscellaneous 
Manufacturing 128 0.0390625 0.1945 217 0 0 
Others 128 0.109375 0.3133 217 0.046083 0.21015 
Germany 128 0 0 217 0.073733 0.26194 
Italy 128 0 0 217 0.041475 0.199846 
Japan 128 0.109375 0.3133 217 0.322581 0.468545 
South Korea 128 0.0859375 0.2814 217 0 0 
United Kingdom 128 0 0 217 0.082949 0.276443 
New Zealand 128 0.0390625 0.1945 217 0 0 
Switzerland 128 0.109375 0.3133 217 0 0 
United States 128 0.65625 0.4768 217 0.479263 0.500725 
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Table 11. ENERGY STAR participating firms 











GEN ELECTRIC CO  1997 https://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/prod_development/revisions/downloads/clotheswash/GE_CW_Comments4.15.05.pd
f?5442-a1e8 
MAYTAG CO  1997 https://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/prod_development/revisions/downloads/clotheswash/Maytag.pdf?5442-a1e8 
AB ELECTROLUX 1998 http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/645988/  
AMANA 







PROD INC  
1998 http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/645988/  




WHIRLPOOL INT BV  1998 https://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=pt_awards.showAwardDetails&esa_id=384 
501 HITACHI LTD 1999 http://tv.manualsonline.com/manuals/mfg/hitachi/42hdt79_55hdt79_42hdx99_55hdx99_1_2.html  
ECOLAB  1999 ftp://ftp.cs.huji.ac.il/cs/adir/mirror/LDP/HOWTO/pdf/Ecology-HOWTO.pdf 
FISHER & PAYKEL 
APPLIANCES LTD  
1999 http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-60020-3_14#page-1 
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CHAPTER 3. IMPACT OF ENERGY-EFFICIENCY POLICIES ON 
INNOVATION: THE CASE OF LIGHTING TECHNOLOGIES 
3.1 Introduction 
Lighting accounts for more than 20% of the total electricity consumed in the U.S. 
(Navigant Consulting, 2002; Azevedo, Morgan, & Morgan, 2009). According to the International 
Energy Agency (IEA)’s report, the potential amount of electricity saved in building lighting  by 
2030 would be equivalent with the entire electricity consumed in Africa in 2013.37 Among 
different types of lighting technologies, fluorescent lamps account for 42% of lighting electricity, 
26% for high-intensity discharge lamps, and 22% for incandescent lamps (Navigant Consulting, 
2012). Lighting sources in this chapter were categoraized into three broad categoeis: 
incandescant, compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs), and light-emitting diodes (LEDs). 
Reflecting on the history of technological development in lighting, light bulb 
technologies have continuously developed to serve consumer needs better.39 An incandescent 
light bulb is a device that emits light when an electric current passes through a filament until it 
glows (Zhu & Humphreys, 2012). The invention of the first incandescent light bulb by Thomas 
Edison and other precursors was the foundation upon which subsequent incandescent light bulb 
designs were based (Friedel & Israel, 2010). It has served as the single most popular lighting 
technology for more than 100 years. For example, the story of the firehouse light bulb that was 
installed in 1903 is interesting because it is still illuminating in 2015. The price of incandescent 
                                                 
37 https://www.iea.org/statistics/relateddatabases/worldenergystatisticsandbalances/ 
39 https://energy.gov/articles/history-light-bulb 
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light bulbs has dropped gradually, and the performance of the light bulbs has improved, but it is 
the least energy efficient of the available technologies. However, incandescent light bulbs were 
widely used historically due to their comparative price advantage over the two emerging 
technologies. 
Unlike an incandescent light bulb, CFLs generate invisible light that excites a fluorescent 
coating inside the tube and then emits visible light when the electric current runs through a tube 
containing argon and mercury vapor (Azevedo et al., 2009). The original fluorescent lamp 
technology was developed in the late 1940s. A CFL looks like an incandescent light bulb, but it 
is more energy efficient and last ten times longer. Although it is a bit more expensive, CFLs are 
cost-effective options in locations where lights are on for long periods of time. U.S. residents 
were slow to adopt CFLs. Beginning in the late 1980s, utilities engaged in demand-side 
management to increase consumers’ adoption of CFLs, but faced technical difficulties. In the late 
1980s and early 1990s, CFLs were bulky and their light performance was not good enough 
compared to incandescent light bulbs. Therefore, consumers disregarded the innovative 
technology and tended not to buy expensive CFLs compared to low-cost incandescent light bulbs 
(Ledbetter, Sandahl, Gilbride, Calwell, & Steward, 2013). Although the market encountered 
several barriers to the diffusion of CFLs, it seems that consumers are more willing to adopt CFLs 
than in the past. 
In contrast, LEDs are semiconductor devices that produce light; in a light bulb, red, 
green, and blue LEDs combine to make white light (Zhu & Humphreys, 2012). There are three 
types of LED lights: solid-state lighting (SSL), organic light-emitting diodes (OLEDs), and light-
emitting polymers (LEPs). They emit little heat, which makes them more energy efficient. The 
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first LED was developed in 1961 and it recently emerged as an alternative technology to replace 
incandescent light bulbs because it has a longer lifespan and is more energy efficient. 
CFLs and LEDs are cost-effective to an incandescant lightbulb, but CFLs and LEDs 
include hazardous materials such as lead, copper, and zinc, while an incandescant lightbulb does 
not contain them (Lim, Kang, Ogunseitan, & Schoenung, 2013). It seems that CFLs are 
competing against LED technology due to the rapid price drop of LEDs. The price of CFLs has 
gradually dropped since 1997, but appears to have recently stabilized. The price of LEDs, on the 
other hand, has rapidly declined in recent years. Since 2011, the price of LED bulbs has dropped 
by 28% to 44% per year, depending on lumen output (Gerke, Ngo, Andrea, & Fisseha, 2014). 
Several studies also indicate potential energy savings and CO2 emission reductions when 
we adopt LEDs. Quirk (2009) indicated that LEDs will significantly improve in the future, but 
CFLs are already becoming a mature technology. In addition, we can reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by adopting more energy-efficient light bulbs. According to a study by the U.S. DOE, 
if we replace LEDs where it is currently feasible with conventional lightbulbs between 2013 to 
2030, we would reduce the electricity for lighting by about 50% in 2030 (Navigant Consulting, 
2014). 
Table 12 shows the comparison of incandescent light bulbs, CFLs, and LEDs. LED is the 
most cost-effective option among three technologies. The high upfront cost of LEDs is the main 
obstacle to high market penetration (National Research Council, 2005; Navigant Consulting, 
2006). Even though the upfront cost of LED is the most expensive, the total cost for ten years is 
the lowest. To increase market penetration, we will continue to make every effort to further 
reduce the upfront cost of LEDs (Azevedo et al., 2009). 
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Table 12. Comparison of three lighting technologies 
 LED Compact Fluorescent Incandescent 
Upfront cost $8 $2 $1 
Energy 11 watts 14 watts 60 watts 
Efficiency* 0.55 0.2 0.05 
Lifetime (hours) 50,000 8,000 1,200 
Power @ 6 hours/day 66 Wh/day 84 Wh/day 360 Wh/day 
Cost per day @ 11 ₵/kWh 0.72 ₵ 0.92 ₵ 3.96 ₵ 
Cost per year @ 11 ₵/kWh $2.64 $3.37 $14.45 
Cost for ten years @ 11 ₵/kWh  
(discount rate: 7%) $19.53 $24.86 $106.55 
*Source: Author’s calculation based on Zhu and Humphreys (2012). 
Many researchers have conducted studies to estimate the impact of environmental policy 
on technological innovation by using patent data (Carrión-Flores & Innes, 2010a; Costantini, 
Crespi, Orsatti, & Palma, 2015; Verdolini & Galeotti, 2011; Noailly & Ryfisch, 2015). They 
found that there is a positive relationship between environmental policy and technological 
innovation that is known as the “policy inducement effect” (Brunnermeier & Cohen, 2003; Jaffe 
& Palmer, 1997; Johnstone, Haščič, & Popp, 2010; Popp, 2002). 
Given the discoveries about the generally positive relationship between environmental 
policy and innovation, what is the role of energy-efficiency policy in technological innovation? 
There appears to be well-designed energy-efficiency policies that also lead to more inventive 
activities. However, Sachs (2012) argues that energy-efficiency policies may not be a direct 
cause of the energy innovation. At first glance, it makes sense because an energy efficiency 
mandate requires meeting a certain minimum energy efficiency criterion. So, if a firm meets the 
minimum standards, it does not have any further incentives to engage in innovation. In this 
paper, we test Sach’s conclusions within the empirical context of lighting technologies. 
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While most of the previous research investigated the impact of domestic policy on 
domestic technological innovation, Lanjouw and Mody (1996) analyzed the effect of domestic 
policy on foreign innovation. They found evidence that strict vehicle emission regulations in the 
United States spurred innovation in Japan and Germany. Subsequently, Popp, Hafner, and 
Johnstone (2011) found a positive correlation between domestic and foreign regulation and 
innovation. 
Along these lines, we pose the following inquiries: First, what are the major international 
or domestic lighting policies that spur lighting innovation? Second, what role do these energy-
efficiency policies play in inducing CFL and LED patenting? Third, which countries play a 
crucial role in energy-efficient lighting patenting in response to U.S. policy (i.e., the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005)? 
We study these questions in the empirical context of lighting technological innovation 
proxy by global patent data. This chapter empirically investigates the causal link between 
domestic and international energy-efficiency policies on CFL and LED innovation. 
Internationally, since Japan was the first to begin increasing the energy efficiency of lighting 
technology, due to the Top Runner Program in 1998 (Grubler & Wilson, 2014), LED innovation 
was initially more likely to occur among Japanese inventors than other inventors. Domestically, 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 has been the most important piece of legislation related to energy-
efficient lighting.40 
                                                 
40 The Energy Policy Act of 1992 did not address lighting. 
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In order to measure the impact of energy-efficiency policy on technological innovation, 
there are several challenges. First, patent data is not a perfect measure of technological 
innovation. However, Griliches (1990) argues that patent data is a good proxy variable for 
innovative activity. Additionally, patent data are the most frequently used metrics to measure a 
creation of new knowledge (Schmookler, 1962;  Griliches, 1990; and Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 
2001; Schmookler, 1966; Scherer, 1965). There is still controversy regarding whether a patent is 
a good measure of innovation output. However, patent count at the firm, industry, and country 
levels can be a useful measure of innovative output in energy technology.41 Second, energy-
efficient technological improvements could be a small portion of inventive activities, so it is 
highly likely that we cannot find any statistically significant results. However, this is not a major 
concern in LED and CFL patents. On the contrary, the number of incandescent light bulb 
patents42 (104) has been very small since 1976. So we omitted the incandescent light bulb from 
the analysis. 
To provide background of which countries and firms are active in LED patenting, we can 
identify top 9 LED firms based on the total revenue43: Nichia (Japan), Osram(Germany), 
Samsung Electronics (Korea), Seoul Semiconductor (Korea), Cree (United States), LG Innotek 
(Korea), Everlight Electronics (Taiwan), Toyoda Gosei(Japan), and Stanley Electric(Japan). 
These firms could dominate the lighting patenting. Or it could be lighting innovation occurs from 
                                                 
41 A discussion of the relationship between patent data and energy innovation output is well documented in Popp's 
(2005) paper. 
42 The IPC code for incandescent light bulb is “F21H.” 
43 https://diarraeg.wordpress.com/2014/10/08/nobel-prize-a-morale-booster-for-japanese-electronics/  
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small or specialized firms such as Sorra, a start-up LED company, supported by ARPA-E from 
June 2012 to April 2015 about $6 million.44 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, since these two policies (1998 and 2005) have 
become an important route to lighting innovation, we identify policy inducement effects in a 
difference-in-difference estimation method on CFL and LED innovation, respectively. Second, 
we explore the differential domestic policy impact on lighting innovation. Third, we identify the 
effect of the domestic policy uncertainty on lighting innovation which plays a crucial role in 
providing momentum for energy innovation (Gallagher et al., 2012). 
3.2 Background 
Table 1 provides international and domestic policies that may affect lighting innovation. 
Japan initiated the Top Runner Program in 1998 to improve the energy efficiency of end-use 
products. Unlike the previous mandatory energy efficiency programs in Japan, the Top Runner 
program was created in response to the Kyoto Protocol45, which was adopted in Japan on 
December 11, 1997, to achieve greenhouse gas emissions targets (i.e., a 6% reduction by 2008–
2012 in comparison to the 1990 baseline level). In the case of fluorescent lighting technology, 
the efficiency standard was set to the most efficient product in the market. Therefore, the targets 
were just achieved right after the implementation of the policy, so it is challenging to measure a 
rate of technological efficiency improvement (Grubler & Wilson, 2014). However, note that this 
does not necessarily imply that there were no inventive activities at all. The Light for the 21st 
                                                 
44 http://www.arpa-e.energy.gov/?q=slick-sheet-project/ammonothermal-growth-gan-substrates-leds 
45 http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php 
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Century Project in Japan began in 1998 and spurred the innovation of the high-efficient 
ultraviolet (UV) light-emitting diodes (LED) and phosphor systems. 
In the United States, the most significant legislation on energy policy since the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992 is the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Key pieces of the legislation were a 
manufacturer and consumer tax incentives and minimum energy-efficiency standards for 16 
products. The Energy Policy Act of 200546 provided a tax deduction for energy-efficient 
commercial buildings beginning in 2006. Inventors have incentives to produce more energy-
efficient products to meet the requirements. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 set new minimum 
efficiency standards for several products, which includes the provision of tax incentives to 
manufacturers. From firms’ perspective, this policy appears to spur innovation. Companies have 
stepped up by taking the initiative to develop more energy-efficient lighting technology. At the 
same time, the demand for more energy-efficient light bulbs has been rising because of the sharp 
decline of LED prices. This demand increase would spur innovation among firms as well. Since 
LEDs are more energy-efficient products than CFLs, we expect to see more innovation in LEDs 
than CFLs. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 had been discussed since 2001 and was signed into 
law in August 2005 (Nadel, Prindle, & Brooks, 2006). Since there is a gap between the initial 
policy discussion and the actual implementation date, high levels of policy uncertainty between 
2001 and 2005 could have either hindered or spurred innovation. 
Similarly, South Korea replaced 40 W fluorescent lamps with 32 W fluorescent lamps in 
2004. Afterward, Korea started its LED Lighting 15/30 Dissemination Project in 2006. In 2008, 
Korea decided to phase out incandescent light bulbs from the market. It appears that Korea is 
                                                 
46 http://energy.gov/savings/energy-efficient-commercial-buildings-tax-deduction 
   
   51
also a leader in energy-efficient lighting technologies and has incentives to increase inventive 
activities in response to the policy change. The EUs’ policy related to the direct support of SSL 
such as EU eco-design Regulation 244/2009 is somewhat belated in comparison to the first-
mover countries: Japan, Korea, and the United States. So, the European Lamp Companies 
Federation called for better policies supporting SSL (European Lamp Companies Federation, 
2011). 
Several factors affect energy innovation. First, the “Induced Innovation” hypothesis 
argues that changes in the relative prices of the factors of production can spur innovation within 
the industry (Hicks, 1932).47 To control for the impact of energy prices on innovation, we 
include the electricity price in regression models. Second, technological change can be induced 
by policy intervention (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2003), thereby creating a demand for clean 
technologies. This demand will create incentives for environmental innovation. In order to 
control for that, we include the growth of household electricity consumption in the econometric 
model to control for electricity market size (Johnstone et al., 2010). It emphasized the interaction 
between environmental policy and technology, which can be used as a criterion for policy 
evaluation. This issue is considered in a growing body of literature (see, for example, Carrión-
Flores and Innes, 2010b; Dechezleprêtre, Neumayer, & Perkins, 2015; Lanjouw and Mody, 
1996; Popp, 2006b; Verdolini & Galeotti, 2011).  
Dechezleprêtre and Glachant (2014) raised a question about whether foreign 
environmental policy influences domestic innovation. Dechezleprêtre et al. (2015) analyzed the 
                                                 
47 For an empirical analysis, Newell, Jaffe, and Stavins (1999) developed a methodology for testing the hypothesis 
by estimating a product characteristic of household appliances. 
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cross-border diffusion of new technologies. Lanjouw and Mody (1996) analyzed the effect of 
policy on innovation in other countries. They found the evidence that strict vehicle emission 
regulation in the U.S. spurred the innovation in Japan and Germany. However, this study is not 
based on the econometric model to provide sufficient evidence to support the causality. Popp 
(2006b) found that strengthening U.S. standards led to more patenting in the U.S., not 
internationally. Subsequently, Popp, Hafner, and Johnstone (2011) also found the positive 
correlation between domestic and foreign regulation and innovation. 
 Figure 5 shows LED patent applications per year. Japanese inventors are the leaders in 
this arena, followed by Korean and the United States inventors, respectively. It seems there was a 
sudden increase in the number of LED patent applications in 1998. It implies that an unknown 
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 Figure 6 shows a clear picture. It is visually evident that there is a discontinuity in 1998. 
This graph is consistent with an impact of the Top Runner Program on lighting patenting. 
Therefore, we hypothesize the following. 
Hypothesis 1.1: Domestic energy-efficiency policy positively influences domestic 
lighting patenting. 
 
Figure 6. CFL Patent applications per year (1992-2007) 
Since we cannot clearly see the United States’ patenting behavior, due to the Y-axis 
scaling issue, we draw it separately in Figure 7 and Figure 8. Figure 7 shows that there is an 
increasing pattern after 2001 in LED patenting. On the other hand, there are two regimes in CFL 
patenting: 1992-2001, and 2001–2007. It suggests an exogenous shock may affect lighting 
patenting. In this case, the Top Runner Program may positively affect the United States 
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Hypothesis 1.2: Domestic energy-efficiency policy positively influences foreign 
lighting patenting. 
The effect of policy uncertainty on innovation is understudied, and it is hard to find a lot 
of empirical studies to support the hypothesis that policy uncertainty plays as significant a role as 
the policy stringency (Johnstone, 2011), but there is anecdotal evidence to support the argument. 
Recently, Löfgren, Millock, and Nauges (2008) found the role of policy uncertainty on 
abatement investment decisions. Barradale (2009) also argued the importance of policy 
predictability in the renewable energy domain.  
Recently, several scholars emphasized this relationship (Bhattacharya, Hsu, Tian, & Xu, 
2013). Kalamova, Johnstone, and Hascic (2012) categorized this relationship into four types of 
policy uncertainty: uncertainty regarding the stringency of the policy, uncertainty relating to the 
timing of the introduction of the policy, uncertainty relating to the nature of the policy instrument 
and uncertainty relating to the durability of the policy. An unexpected and frequent change in 
environmental policy can discourage firms from investing in innovation. Firms under regulatory 
uncertainty may not precisely calculate the costs and benefits of environmental improvement 
(Considine & Larson, 2006). Under uncertain policy conditions, firms are less likely to invest in 
R&D, which results in less output (Bosetti & Victor, 2011; Nemet, 2010; Gallagher, Grübler, 
Kuhl, Nemet, & Wilson, 2012). In energy technology innovation literature, several scholars also 
underscored that impotance of policy stability (Grubler & Wilson, 2014). Most of case studies in 
their book support that policy credibility and continuity is one of key factors for successufl 
energy technology innovation system. 
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In this chapter, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 was initially discussed in 2001 and was 
almost finalized in 2003. It took approximately four years to implement the act. Foreign 
inventors had incentives to file patent applications to preempt lighting innovation. Considering 
the size of the U.S. market, it is plausible foreign inventors filed patent applications to protect 
their intellectual property with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and other major 
patent offices at the same time, even before the Energy Policy Act of 2005 was implemented. 
Even if U.S. government policy is uncertain, foreign inventors have incentive to protect their 
intellectual property rights for various reasons such as licensing or selling the invention, good 
image for company’s market value. On the other hand, domestic inventors are reluctant to invest 
their R&D until the actual implementation of the policy, so domestic inventors are less likely to 
respond to policy uncertainty. Or we even expect to see a negative relationship between domestic 
policy uncertainty and domestic lighting patenting. In a nutshell, we dichotomize the impact of 
domestic policy uncertainty on domestic and foreign lighting patenting. Therefore, we 
hypothesize the followings: 
Hypothesis 2.1: Domestic policy uncertainty negatively affects domestic lighting 
patenting.   
Hypothesis 2.2: Domestic policy uncertainty positively affects foreign lighting 
patenting.  
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Figure 7. LED patent applications                                     
Figure 8. CFL patent applications 
3.3 Methods 
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We collected patent data from the EPO/OECD World Patent Statistical Database 
(PATSTAT)50 to analyze inventive behaviors related to LEDs and CFLs across countries. 
PATSTAT contains patents filed in more than eighty patent offices and includes more than sixty-
five million patent applications and thirty million granted patents. However, PATSTAT has a 
significant missing inventor/applicant-country information problem, especially for Japanese 
patents. To overcome this challenge, we filled in the missing country information from two 
patent families (i.e., simple [DOCDB] and extended [INPADOC]), as well as the individuals’ 
names and identification. For the rest, we use the common first name to fill in the missing 
country information. After that, we drop the remaining missing values (fewer than 5% of the 
total patents). In order to better count the number of patents by country, we use the fractional 
count. This method improves the international comparability of patent counts (Hélène Dernis & 
Guellec, 2001). Alternatively, we also check the robustness of our findings by counting first 
country of inventors. Our findings are robust to different ways of defining the dependent 
variable. 
In order to retrieve relevant patents, we rely on two definitions of lighting technologies. 
First, the OECD and EPO (OECD, 2012) identified “technologies related to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation.” This category includes lighting technologies that map into the 
international patent classification (IPC) codes. For example, it identifies LEDs as “H05B” or 
“F21K”51 and CFLs as “H01J 61.” Dechezleprêtre, Martin, and Mohnen (2013) used the same 
IPCs to discern between clean and dirty technologies. Since these IPCs do not capture the recent 
                                                 
50 PATSTAT Oct 2013 edition. PATSTAT data comes from the Enterprise Innovation Institute at Georgia Institute 
of Technology. 
51 H05B33: Electroluminescent light sources (LED), F21K9: Electric lamps using semiconductor devices as a light-
generating element, for example by using light emitting diodes (LED)  
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development of OLED technologies, we also add additional IPCs related to LEDs (Simons & 
Sanderson, 2011; Sanderson & Simons, 2014). Table 19 provides the description of IPCs related 
to lighting technologies. 
To show different angles of the constructed data, we restrict Japanese patent applications 
filed in the JPO and compare them in the USPTO, which are shown in Figure 12 and Figure 13. 
Figure 13 shows that Japanese inventors had filed LED patent applications since the late 1990s. 
On the other hand, the number of patent applications in the USPTO started to increase around 
2003, shown in Figure 12. These Figures show a clear difference between the JPO and USPTO 
patent applications related to lighting technologies. The most notable difference is that Japanese 
inventors started to file patent applications to the JPO around 1998 and then filed patent 
applications to the USPTO around 2001. The possible explanation is that Japanese inventors 
have incentives to file patent applications to the USPTO, which protects their property rights in 
the potential significant energy-efficient lighting market in response to the Energy Policy Act of 
2005. 
3.3.2 Difference-in-difference 
Table 20 reports the number of patents by country of the inventors between 1992 and 
2007 for both LEDs and CFLs. Japan is the leading country in patenting, followed by Korea, the 
United States, and Germany. We assess the number of patents by fractional country counts by 
the extended patent family.60 Figure 11 provides the description of the number of patents filed in 
                                                 
60 We detect a structural break in 2006 with the full sample (1966–2013) and trimmed sample (1974–2006). We also 
conduct a structural break test with the full sample (1980–2010) and trimmed sample (1986–2006) and find the same 
result. 
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three patent offices, the USPTO, JPO, and EPO, and shows the significant patenting surge by 
Japanese inventors. The triadic patent count eliminates home-advantage bias and represents 
patents of high value. In order to better represent the inventors’ country information; we relied 
on a fractional country count as opposed to the first-inventor country information.  
This chapter follows economics of energy innovation literature and the relationship 
between R&D funding, electricity consumption, and energy prices, economic growth and 
technological innovation is expressed controlling for following variables61: energy efficient 
Research, Development and Demonstration (RD&D) expenditure, the growth of household 
electricity consumption, electricity price62, and the growth of GDP. To be more specific, RD&D 
expenditure63 for nineteen countries64 is included in IEA’s energy technology research and 
development database.65 The growth of household electricity consumption data66 come from 
IEA’s Energy Balances Database.67 Electricity price data68 come from residential end-user 
prices, which can be obtained from IEA’s Energy Prices and Taxes Database. We eliminated 
duplicates and restricted data to the span of time between 1992 and 2007. The growth of GDP 
data comes from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
database.69 It is expected that the signs of RD&D expenditure and electricity price are positive. 
                                                 
61 We restrict to the nineteen countries in order to match control variables. 
62 USD PPP/unit 
63 Total RD&D in Million USD (2013 prices and PPP) of the energy efficiency. RD&D covers basic research, 
applied research, experimental development, and demonstration of a prototype of a technology. 
https://www.iea.org/media/statistics/questionnaires/RDDQuestionnaire.pdf  
64 Nineteen countries are: Japan, United States, Canada, Korea, Germany, United Kingdom, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, France, Sweden, Norway, Italy, Finland, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, and New 
Zealand 
65 http://wds.iea.org/WDS/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx 
66 The growth rate is calculated by (Post consumption/current consumption)^(1/9)-1 
67 http://www.iea.org/statistics/topics/energybalances/ 
68 The missing data are interpolated. 
69 https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=60702# 
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To measure the impact of the energy efficiency policy on innovation, it is neither possible 
to run a randomized experiment nor to find a good instrument variable. Instead, a difference-in-
difference estimation method allows us to estimate the net effect of policy change: the total 
number of patent application changes minus the the number of patent applications that would 
have been filed anyway. So, this method compares the number of patent applications for a 
treatment country of inventors directly affected by the policy change with those for a control 
group of similar inventors. It was first used in estimating the minimum wage impact on 
employment in 1992 (Card & Krueger, 1994). Because this method is not assumption free, we 
also checked the common trend assumption, which is shown in Figure 5 through Figure 8.  
We identify the impact of domestic policy on the domestic lighting patenting in the case 
of Japan. First, we identify the effect of the Top Runner Program of the Energy Conservation law 
(1998) on the number of patent applications. Second, we identify the effect of the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005 on lighting patenting. A standard difference-in-difference regression model to 
compare before and after the policy change is specified as: 
 𝑁𝑜. 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽3𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡×𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡
+ 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + εi,t 
(5) 
Where 𝑖=1,…..,19 refers to the country and 𝑡=1992,…,2007 refers to time. The Country 
is the inventor country. POST indicates the period after the policy implementation. This variable 
is a dummy variable which coded “1” after the policy implementation, and “0” otherwise. X are 
control variables: RD&D refers to energy efficiency RD&D expenditure. ELEC refers to the 
growth of household electric consumption. PRICE_ELEC refers to the household electricity 
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price data. GDP refers to the growth of Gross Domestic Product. 𝜶 and 𝜸 each refer to time and 
country fixed effects. In addition, all the remaining errors are captured in the 𝜺. 
3.3.3 Estimation Results 
Table 13 shows that POST×JP is statistically significantly positive in both technologies. 
Note that the magnitude of the LED coefficient is far greater than the coefficient of CFL (about 
ten times greater). The plausible explanation is that LED patenting is mainly driven by the 
combination of two Japanese policies: the 21st Century Lighting Project and the Top Runner 
Program, while the CFL patenting is only driven by fluorescent light efficiency standard (16.6% 
increase in lm/W (FY 1997 vs. FY 2005). The results provides evidence of a positive 
relationship between domestic energy-efficiency policies on domestic innovation, which 
supports Hypothesis 1.1. 
Table 14 provides the estimation results on the impact of the United States lighting policy 
in the United States lighting innovation. Column (1)-(3) shows that POST×US is statistically 
significant at the 10% significance level for LED lighting. Column (4)-(6) shows no statistical 
significance for CFL lighting, suggesting that the impact of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 is not 
salient. Overall, the effect is not noticeable. In the case of the United States, Table 14 does not 
provide strong evidence of a positive relationship between domestic energy-efficiency policies 
on domestic lighting innovation which can be explained by the role of other countries’ inventive 
activities. Both Tables also show some evidence of positive relationship between RD&D funding 
and lighting patenting, but evidence is weak.  
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Table 13. The impact of the Top Runner Program 
  LED   CFL  
 YEAR FE Country FE Year/Country FE YEAR FE Country FE Year/Country FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
JP 345.3*** 295.5*** 352.6*** 178.6*** 187.4*** 194.0*** 
 (36.92) (29.78) (39.51) (5.918) (5.444) (6.524) 
POST -80.58 6.425 -18.77 -11.63 2.754 -4.442 
 (51.55) (17.15) (51.83) (10.99) (2.741) (10.72) 
POST×JP 1,747*** 1,661*** 1,723*** 188.8*** 172.6*** 176.4*** 
 (206.2) (267.3) (235.6) (14.79) (19.10) (15.81) 
RD&D 0.122** 0.296*** 0.145 0.0576*** 0.0941*** 0.0861*** 
 (0.0617) (0.0906) (0.0928) (0.00863) (0.0132) (0.0125) 
Electricity price -0.0443 1.184** -0.354 0.0877 0.174** 0.0583 
 (0.305) (0.476) (0.548) (0.0647) (0.0826) (0.0836) 
Electricity 
consumption 
14.69 -0.549 -0.722 1.602* -0.741 -0.280 
 (9.020) (4.148) (4.932) (0.885) (0.454) (0.478) 
GDP 62.66*** 13.95 31.47 5.191* 2.046 3.985 
 (20.61) (14.05) (28.31) (2.915) (1.856) (3.275) 
Constant -58.11 -186.4* 15.30 -13.63 -31.10* -22.96 
 (56.78) (100.4) (103.0) (9.885) (16.04) (15.76) 
Year FE YES NO YES YES NO YES 
Country FE NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Observations 242 242 242 186 186 186 
R-squared 0.737 0.867 0.883 0.915 0.965 0.969 
Notes: 
1. POST equals 1 after 1998. 
2. JP indicates those whose inventor country location is Japan. 
3. Observations indicate the number of countries multiplied by the number of years 
4. Column (1) through (3): I restricted the sample to LED patents 
5. Column (4) through (6): I restricted the sample to CFL patents. 
6. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 14. The impact of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
  LED   CFL  
 YEAR FE Country FE Year/Country FE YEAR FE Country FE Year/Country FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
US -2,134*** -1,398*** -1,589*** -389.9*** -166.2*** -185.2*** 
 (272.6) (317.2) (313.4) (31.13) (30.22) (27.65) 
POST -150.1 80.82 -86.52 -44.31* 9.212 -7.647 
 (127.0) (59.30) (130.0) (24.28) (6.318) (13.23) 
POST×US 325.8* 258.9* 302.0** 41.46 19.57 22.72 
 (173.6) (135.7) (135.3) (34.31) (19.83) (18.41) 
RD&D 3.837*** 2.720*** 2.949*** 0.748*** 0.378*** 0.401*** 
 (0.443) (0.513) (0.520) (0.0387) (0.0445) (0.0426) 
Electricity price 0.562 1.031* 0.512 0.259*** 0.164** 0.104 
 (0.404) (0.599) (0.619) (0.0919) (0.0791) (0.101) 
Electricity 
consumption 
12.29 -0.857 -3.457 2.022 -0.724 -0.587 
 (9.855) (6.996) (8.666) (1.383) (0.852) (0.972) 
GDP 67.00*** 8.455 37.82 4.354 1.846 5.518* 
 (20.47) (12.40) (26.12) (3.144) (1.621) (2.888) 
Constant -142.7* -222.4** -106.6 -22.13 -33.67** -28.70* 
 (76.14) (109.4) (105.5) (20.68) (13.42) (16.02) 
Year FE YES NO YES YES NO YES 
Country FE NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Observations 242 242 242 186 186 186 
R-squared 0.644 0.779 0.799 0.805 0.936 0.944 
Notes: 
1. POST equals one after 2005. 
2. The US indicates those whose inventor country location is the United States. 
3. Observations indicate the number of countries multiplied by the number of years 
4. Column (1) through (3): I restricted the sample to LED patents 
5. Column (4) through (6): I restricted the sample to CFL patents. 
6. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
7. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3.4 Differential Impact for LED and CFL 
3.4.1 Difference-in-difference-in-difference 
As a robustness check, a triple difference-in-difference estimation provides sensitivity 
tests on our findings. Previously, Table 14 shows the differential impact of LED and CFL patents 
in response to the Energy Policy Act of 2005. To investigate further heterogeneity across two 
lighting technologies, a difference-in-difference-in-difference model is specified as: 
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  𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡×𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡×𝐿𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡×𝐿𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡×𝐿𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡×𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡    
(6) 
Where 𝑖=1,….,19 refers to the country and 𝑡=1992,…,2007 refers to time. The Country 
is the inventor country. POST indicates the period after the policy implementation. LED is a 
binary variable which indicates LED patents. Otherwise, it belongs to CFL patents. 𝑋 are control 
variables: RD&D refers to energy efficiency RD&D expenditure. ELEC refers to the growth of 
household electric consumption. PRICE_ELEC refers to the electricity price data. GDP refers 
to the growth of Gross Domestic Product. α and γ each refer to time and country fixed effects. In 
addition, all the remaining errors are captured in the ε. 
3.4.2 Estimation Results 
Table 15 reports the estimation results on the triple difference-in-difference estimation 
results. Column (1)-(3) shows that POST×JP×LED is statistically positively significant. The 
results provide the evidence to support Hypothesis 1.2 that domestic policy positively influences 
foreign LED patenting, particularly Japanese patenting. Since the magnitude of the coefficient is 
large, it is plausible that Japanese inventors drive most of the LED innovations in response to the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005. Consistent with previous literature, the results show positive effect of 
RD&D funding on lighting patenting. It also confirms the induced innovation hypothesis that 
rising electricity prices positively affect energy-saving innovation. We also run the modified 
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regressions, but we do not find any significant results: POST×US×LED and POST×KR×LED. 
For the brevity of the paper, we report these results in the Appendix. 
Table 15. The impact of the Energy Policy Act of 2005: policy certainty 
 YEAR FE Country FE Year/Country FE 
 (1) (2) (3) 
POST×JP×LED 1,371*** 1,343*** 1,343*** 
 (257.1) (261.6) (255.2) 
POST×LED 134.4** 162.8*** 162.3*** 
 (54.86) (46.13) (46.66) 
JP×LED 849*** 849*** 849*** 
 (241.6) (244.0) (240.1) 
JP 231.0*** 172.5*** 211.3*** 
 (28.95) (33.81) (33.44) 
POST 20.54 -101.3*** -39.06 
 (62.27) (36.50) (58.64) 
POST×JP 90.23*** 133.9*** 127.7*** 
 (25.36) (37.71) (32.81) 
RD&D 0.276*** 0.598*** 0.551*** 
 (0.0686) (0.136) (0.127) 
Electricity price 0.117 1.648*** 1.049** 
 (0.166) (0.589) (0.471) 
Electricity consumption 5.446 -2.763 -4.240 
 (6.912) (4.412) (5.552) 
GDP 26.47** -1.011 3.280 
 (12.17) (7.028) (13.64) 
Constant -92.17* -322.5*** -268.0** 
 (49.67) (114.1) (105.8) 
Year FE YES NO YES 
Country FE NO YES YES 
Observations 428 428 428 
R-squared 0.647 0.734 0.742 
Notes: 
1. POST equals 1 after 2005 
2. JP indicates those whose inventor country location is Japan. 
3. Observations indicate the number of countries multiplied by the number of years 
4. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3.4.3 Difference-in-difference (policy uncertainty) 
 To further look into the effect of policy uncertainty, a difference-in-difference model is 
specified as: 
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  𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡×𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡×𝐿𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑡×𝐿𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑡×𝐿𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡×𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡    
(7) 
Where 𝑖=1,….,19 refers to the country and 𝑡=1992,…,2007 refers to time. The Country 
is the inventor country. UNCERTAIN indicates the period between the initial policy discussion 
and the final implementation: 2001-2004. LED is a binary variable which indicates LED patents. 
Otherwise, it belongs to CFL patents. 𝑿 are control variables: RD&D refers to energy efficiency 
RD&D expenditure. ELEC refers to the growth of household electric consumption. 
PRICE_ELEC refers to the electricity price data. GDP refers to the growth of Gross Domestic 
Product. 𝜶 and 𝜸 each refer to time and country fixed effects. In addition, all the remaining errors 
are captured in the 𝜺. 
3.4.4 Estimation Results 
Table 16 reports the estimation results of the impact of policy uncertainty. Column (1)-(3), 
𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐴𝐼𝑁×JP×LED71, shows a statistically significant positive result. The magnitude of the 
coefficient is less than the previous estimation results. Therefore, these results support 
Hypothesis 2.2, which indicates that domestic policy uncertainty positively affects foreign 
lighting innovation. To double-check findings, we include the triple difference-in-difference 
estimation results in the United States LED patenting in the Table 22 and Table 23. The evidence 
is not strong enough to support Hypothesis 2.1.  We find the consistent results in RD&D 
funding. However, the effect of electricity price is mixed. 
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Table 16. The impact of the Energy Policy Act of 2005: policy uncertainty 
 YEAR FE Country FE Year/Country FE 
 (1) (2) (3) 
𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐴𝐼𝑁×JP×LED 1,119*** 1,094*** 1,095*** 
 (333.4) (357.1) (350.6) 
𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐴𝐼𝑁×LED 75.05** 100.2*** 99.69*** 
 (32.52) (33.03) (33.28) 
JP×LED 832.7*** 832.7*** 832.7*** 
 (271.3) (276.2) (274.5) 
JP 222.8*** 177.4*** 219.8*** 
 (26.36) (30.88) (29.64) 
UNCERTAIN 33.69 -63.48** -15.32 
 (53.90) (29.22) (52.51) 
𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐴𝐼𝑁×JP 107.3*** 70.55 93.80** 
 (40.34) (44.76) (43.84) 
RD&D 0.225*** 0.549*** 0.444*** 
 (0.0631) (0.132) (0.116) 
Electricity price -0.00561 1.834*** 0.570 
 (0.171) (0.538) (0.435) 
Electricity consumption 10.93* -0.0353 1.716 
 (6.217) (3.965) (4.639) 
GDP 20.53* 2.788 -2.331 
 (10.73) (6.830) (11.38) 
Constant -74.00 -344.7*** -193.2* 
 (47.03) (112.1) (100.2) 
Year FE YES NO YES 
Country FE NO YES YES 
Observations 428 428 428 
R-squared 0.628 0.706 0.715 
Notes: 
1. UNCERTAIN equals one if the year of application is between 2001 and 2004. 
2. JP indicates those whose inventor country location is Japan. 
3. Observations indicate the number of countries multiplied by the number of years 
4. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Previously, we coded the policy uncertainty as a binary variable. This is obviously not the 
best representation form of the policy uncertainty. However, it is almost impossible to capture all 
those aspects of policy uncertainty with a single metric. In this paper, we use a coefficient of 
variation of R&D expenditure as a proxy of policy uncertainty to measure country-level RD&D 
investment variability (Czarnitzki & Toole, 2011; Kalamova, Johnstone, & Hascic, 2012). The 
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coefficient of variation is frequently used to measure dispersion which takes the absolute value 
of the standard deviation, normalize it by the mean in equation (8). 
 


















                               (8) 
Where 𝑡 is a year and 𝑖 indicates a country, and RD&D indicates RD&D expenditure. 
Figure 9 displays the measures of policy uncertainty for the U.S. and Japan.72 The most 
notable feature in this Figure is that there is a huge unpredictability in Japan in the 1990s while 
the U.S. policy uncertainty slightly grows between 2001 and 2005. Compared to this spike in 
1994, the U.S. change much lower. 
 
Figure 9. A measure of policy uncertainty73 
                                                 
72 Since South Korea’s RD&D expenditure data is not available before 2001, we do not include it in this graph. 
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In the following regression analysis, we expect the sign of the coefficients to be negative 
because domestic policy uncertainty can negatively affect domestic innovation. Table 17 shows 
the estimation results. Panel A demonstrate the effect of contemporary policy on innovation, 
while Panels B and C indicate the effect of one-year lag, two-year lag, respectively. The 
coefficients of interest are a triple difference.  
While there is a significant negative relationship between Japan’s policy uncertainties on 
Japanese innovation, the effect of U.S. policy uncertainties on U.S. innovation is not significant. 
This exercise reveals that Japan’s inventing behavior is more responsive to RD&D funding 
variability than those of U.S. However, the effects of U.S. RD&D are highly significant in the 
contemporary regression and with one and two-year lags. 
The effect of policy uncertainty fades away as time passes by, but the effect of one-year 
lag is the highest among three estimation results. To check the robustness of the models, we 
restrict the sample between 2000-2004, and 2001-2005. The negative and significant findings of 
the effect of Japan’s policy uncertainty are consistent with the previous findings. 
Table 17. Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference Estimation Results of Policy Uncertainty  
 
US_contemp JP_contemp US_1year_lag JP_1year_lag US_2year_lag JP_2ye
ar_lag 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A.       
Contemporary Effect       
Pol_uncertainty -122.6** -43.21**     
 (60.23) (20.35)     
Pol_uncertainty×US 578.1      
 (352.0)      
Pol_uncertainty×LED -117.2* 15.08     
 (64.25) (22.64)     
Pol_uncertainty×US×LED -174.7      
 (428.5)      
Pol_uncertainty×JP  -15.93     
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Table 17 continued  (97.26)     
Pol_uncertainty×JP×LED   -1,928***     
  (514.0)     
Panel B.       
One-year Lag       
Pol_uncertainty1   -133.9** -31.89*   
Table 17 Continued       
   (58.21) (16.63)   
Pol_uncertainty1×US   698.5***    
   (265.5)    
Pol_uncertainty1×LED   -88.78 26.78   
   (64.65) (22.61)   
Pol_uncertainty1×US×LED   -128.4    
   (693.7)    
Pol_uncertainty1×JP    -50.21   
    (84.74)   
Pol_uncertainty1×JP×LED    -3,218***   
    (693.2)   
Panel C.       
Two-year Lag       
Pol_uncertainty2     -103.0* -14.26 
     (59.60) (17.40) 
Pol_uncertainty2 ×US     694.7**  
     (351.0)  
Pol_uncertainty2×LED     -88.67 3.955 
     (59.87) (17.77) 
Pol_uncertainty2×US×LED     -318.2  
     (444.4)  
Pol_uncertainty2×JP      -31.50 
      (115.1) 
Pol_uncertainty2×JP×𝑳𝑬𝑫      -
1,988*
** 
      (554.8) 
Panel D.       
Control Variables       
US -758.8***  -857.2***    
 (269.1)  (273.0)    
LED 185.1*** 45.18*** 172.9*** 35.09*** 168.1*** 38.85*
** 
 (44.84) (9.316) (43.92) (7.961) (42.43) (8.702) 
US×LED -16.94  -5.749  24.95  
 (103.8)  (141.7)  (117.1)  
JP  223.5  275.1  161.9 
  (166.4)  (171.3)  (214.7) 
JP×LED  1,921***  2,253***  2,012*
** 
  (250.8)  (232.0)  (267.5) 
RD&D 1.398*** 0.482 1.485*** 0.367 1.493*** 0.654 
 (0.403) (0.332) (0.414) (0.335) (0.420) (0.428) 
Electricity price 0.338 0.147 0.121 0.0299 0.0107 0.0380 
 (0.437) (0.240) (0.420) (0.215) (0.396) (0.230) 
Electricity consumption 1.827 3.300 0.596 -1.289 -0.363 -1.750 
 (6.862) (2.963) (6.770) (1.882) (6.820) (2.749) 
GDP 24.38 21.38 20.09 15.96* 23.63 25.35*
* 
 (15.97) (14.36) (14.90) (8.269) (15.28) (11.03) 
Constant -120.8 -77.39* -113.2 -93.26* -142.2* -
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110.1*
* 
Table 17 continued (78.63) (45.21) (71.94) (53.00) (74.02) (54.49) 
       
Observations 412 412 410 410 408 408 
R-squared 0.582 0.843 0.593 0.894 0.577 0.865 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: 
1. Pol_uncertainty 1 indicates policy uncertainty one-year lag. 
2. Pol_uncertainty 2 indicates policy uncertainty two-year lag. 
3. Robust standard errors in parentheses 




This paper exploits two quasi-experiments in lighting technology to identify the impact of 
energy-efficiency policies on CFL and LED innovation. The first quasi-experiment (e.g., the Top 
Runner Program) allows us to explore two hypotheses: the effect of the domestic energy-
efficiency policy on domestic lighting patenting, and the effect of domestic energy-efficiency 
policy on foreign lighting patenting.  
The second quasi-experiment (e.g., the Energy Policy Act of 2005) enables us to identify 
four hypotheses addressing the effect of domestic energy-efficiency policy on domestic lighting 
patenting, the effect of domestic energy-efficiency policy on foreign lighting patenting, the effect 
of domestic policy uncertainty on foreign lighting patenting, and the effect of domestic policy 
uncertainty on domestic lighting patenting. For simplicity, only significant results are discussed 
below. 
The quasi-experiments produce strong evidence that the Top Runner Program positively 
affects Japanese lighting patenting: CFLs and LEDs. However, we only find a significant 
positive relationship between the Energy Policy Act of 2005 on the United States LED patenting 
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at the 10% significance level. Our results indicate that the Energy Policy Act of 2005 was a 
significant driver of LED innovation, while the evidence is weak on CFL innovation. Domestic 
energy-efficiency policy positively affects domestic lighting patenting. 
In order to identify the effect of domestic energy efficiency policy on foreign lighting is 
patenting, we further explore the differential impact of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 on lighting 
patenting. We find strong evidence that the Energy Policy Act of 2005 positively affected 
Japanese lighting patenting. Consistent with previous studies, we show that domestic energy-
efficiency policy can be an effective policy tool to drive foreign lighting patenting. 
We also find evidence of patenting surges after the initial discussion in 2001 of the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005. So, it is evident that there is a statistically significant policy-
inducement effect, but patenting started to increase earlier than the actual implementation of the 
policy in 2005. 
However, we cannot find any evidence to support the effect of policy uncertainty of the 
U.S. Energy Policy Act of 2005 on domestic lighting patenting. So, what we can conclude from 
these findings is that firms are constantly innovating, and they are filing patent applications not 
only in response to the policy change but also for various reasons such as licensing activities, 
catching investors, and blockading competitors. 
When it comes to the effect of policy uncertainty on lighting patenting, we find the 
negative and significant effect of Japan’s policy uncertainty on Japan’s lighting innovation. Over 
several decades, the Japan’s RD&D expenditure was more volatile than the U.S. expenditure, so 
this funding variability negatively affects Japan’s LED innovation.  
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Note the total number of patent applications filed by Japanese inventors is relatlvey 
flatter than the those of U.S. inventors over the years.74 This validates our estimation results in 
two ways. First, a very sharp increase by Japanese inventors was not driven by the general 
national trend, but the impact of the policy change. Second, the increaseing number of patents in 
the U.S. implies the overestimation of our results that also validate our non-significant results by 
U.S. inventors. 
The limitation of this paper is as follows. We mainly focus on the impact of three 
countries energy efficiency policy on innovation because these countries file the majority of 
patents. However, it is possible that European countries can also play a significant role in 
inducing these technologies. We further relax this assumption to incorporate the entire scope of 
the countries. For example, the United Kingdom implemented a plan to phase out traditional 
light bulbs by 2012. After that, most EU countries agreed to implement an incandescent light 
bulb phase out (Waide & Tanishima, 2006; Waide, 2010). 
The potential measurement error leads to attenuation bias using a binary indicator of 
whether a country had an energy-efficiency policy or not as the policy variable is well addressed 
in Anin Aroonruengsawat, Maximilian Auffhammer, & Sanstad (2012)’s paper. Their paper 
hand coded new building permits from Census Bureau sources in order to overcome issues by 
incorporating the heterogeneity in policy intensity, stringency, and enforcement. This is in the 
area of future research.  
3.6 Conclusions 
                                                 
74 http://blog.nycdatascience.com/student-works/research-and-development-performance-in-select-countries/ 
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First, this paper identifies the impact of the domestic energy efficiency policy on 
domestic lighting patenting in the case of Japan and the U.S. Though there is a significant 
positive relationship between Japanese energy efficiency policy on Japanese lighting patenting, 
the evidence is weak concerning the U.S.’s energy efficiency policy on U.S. lighting inventive 
activities. This is because the Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided some incentives for energy 
efficiency improvement, but it did not regulate the lighting industry and lighting industry 
products. Later, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) phased out 
incandescant light bulbs, which significantly changed the U.S. lighting industry. 
Second, this paper presents evidence that domestic energy efficiency policy stimulates 
foreign energy efficiency lighting patenting in the case of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The 
domestic energy efficiency policy can be a significant driver of foreign patenting because Japan 
accounts for the largest LED lighting market share, at 26% in 2014.75 In a nutshell, Japanese 
inventors have greater responsiveness to environmental policy changes. 
Third, we find strong evidence of the adverse effect of Japan’s policy uncertainty on 
Japan’s LED innovation. However, we cannot find any significant evidence that U.S. policy 
uncertainty negatively affects U.S. LED patenting. To investigate the reason U.S.RD&D 
expenditure is not a signficant factor on U.S. LED patenting, we need to investiage the 
relationship between firms’ R&D expenditure and government R&D expenditure. This is an area 
for future research. 
                                                 
75 http://www.digitimes.com/news/a20140107PD202.html 
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Lastly, energy-efficiency standards create demand for environmental innovation, and 
firms innovate themselves to produce more energy-efficient goods and services (Vollebergh & 
van der Werf, 2014). Policy makers should pay attention to international dimensions of energy-
efficiency standard setting because policy and innovation is interwined in an international 
domain. Therefore, a salutary process that promises to strengthen standards internationally and 
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Table 18. Lighting policies across countries 
Country Year Policy Contents 
 
2003  S&L R&D Project  2003-2005  
United 
States 2005 Energy Policy Act of 2005 
Solid-State Lighting Program 
Minimum standards for bare and covered medium 
screw base self-ballasted CFLs manufactured for use 
in the U.S. 
 2007 
The Energy Independence and Security 
Act of 2007 (EISA) 
It began phasing out 100W incandescent light bulbs 
in 2012, 75W in 2013, and 40 & 60W in 2014, 
consequentially. 
Japan 1993 
Efficiency standards for fluorescent 
lamps  
The government called for an improvement in 
energy efficiency by 2000 of 3–7% compared to the 
level of 1992.  
 
1998 21st Century Lighting Project 




Top Runner Program of the Energy 
Conservation Law 
To improve energy efficiency of end-use products 
e.g.) Fluorescent lights: 16.6 % increase in lm/W 
(FY 1997 vs. FY 2005) 
 
2001  
Semiconductor lighting national 
program  1993-1996, 1999-2000, 2001  
South 
Korea 2004  
Replacement of 40W fluorescent lamps 
with 32W fluorescent lamps  
The increase of the MEPS standard (66 lm/W -> 80 
lm/W) for 40W fluorescent lamps in January 2004 
accelerated the replacement of 40W fluorescent 
lamps with 32W fluorescent lamps.  
 
2006  
LED Lighting 15/30 Dissemination 
Project   
It aims to increase the share of LED lights to 30% by 
2015 (Ministry of Knowledge Economy)  
Sources:  
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Table 19. International Patent Classification (IPC) related to lighting technologies 
Lighting Category Description Sources 
Incandescent F21H Incandescent lamp OECD 
CFL H01J 61 Gas- or vapor-discharge lamps (Compact 
Fluorescent 
Lamp) 
LED F21K9 Electric lamps using semiconductor devices 
as light generating element, e.g., using light 
emitting diodes (LED) 





H01L33/00  Semiconductor devices for light emission, 
including manufacture and details thereof 
(Simons & 
Sanderson, 2011) 
G09G3/30 Circuits for readable displays using 
electroluminescent panels 
G09G3/32 As G09G3/30, using semiconductors 
G09F9/33 Pixel-based displays using semiconductors 
H01L 27/15 Solid-state circuitry incorporating 
semiconductor light-emitting devices 
G09G3/14 As G09G3/32, but for displaying a single 
character 
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Table 20. Number of Patents for Both LEDs and CFLS, by Country of Inventors (1992-2007) 
 
Country No. of patents Percent (%) No. of patents Percent (%) 
AT 108 0.3% 18 0.2% 
AU 42 0.1% 2 0.0% 
BE 83 0.2% 76 0.9% 
CA 329 0.8% 25 0.3% 
CH 1,505 3.7% 328 3.7% 
DE 1,732 4.2% 967 10.9% 
DK 64 0.2% 18 0.2% 
ES 30 0.1% 3 0.0% 
FI 43 0.1% 0 0.0% 
FR 282 0.7% 44 0.5% 
GB 543 1.3% 79 0.9% 
IT 107 0.3% 22 0.2% 
JP 23,361 56.8% 5,260 59.5% 
KR 9,835 23.9% 872 9.9% 
NL 435 1.1% 370 4.2% 
NO 5 0.0% 0 0.0% 
NZ 3 0.0% 0 0.0% 
SE 27 0.1% 11 0.1% 
US 2,590 6.3% 745 8.4% 
Total 41,124 100.0% 8,840 100.0% 
*AT (Austria), AU (Australia), BE (Belgium), CA (Canada), CH (Switzerland), DE (Germany), DK (Denmark), ES (Spain), FI 
(Finland), FR (France), GB (United Kingdom), IT (Italy), JP (Japan), KR (Korea) ,  NL (Netherlands), NO(Norway),  NZ (New 
Zealand), SE (Sweden), and US (United States) 
*Source: http://www.wipo.int/pct/guide/en/gdvol1/annexes/annexk/ax_k.pdf 
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Table 21. Summary Statistics: key variables 
  
Mean Std. Min Max Unit 
Filing year 2002.839 3.718683 1992 2007 Year 
US 0.070968 0.2567741 0 1 Percentage (1) 
JP 0.609048 0.4879688 0 1 Percentage (1) 
KR 0.16462 0.3708414 0 1 Percentage (1) 
RDD 339.9436 222.8748 0 752.318 Million USD 
(2013 prices and PPP) 
RDD1 333.6072 233.3377 0 752.318 Million USD 
(2013 prices and PPP) 
RDD2 325.9584 241.7883 0 752.318 Million USD 
(2013 prices and PPP) 
ELEC_Price 146.7481 30.70582 52.858 253.834 USD PPP/MWh 
ELEC_Con 2.497427 2.629535 -
12.6312 
10.71921 Percentage Change 
GDP 2.153551 1.663093 -3.3 6.3 Percentage Change 
N 46993 
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Figure 10. CFL & LED Patent applications per year: extended patent family 
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Figure 12. USPTO patents by fractional country counts 
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Table 22. The impact of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 on domestic patenting:  
policy certainty 
 YEAR FE Country FE Year/Country FE 
 (1) (2) (3) 
POST×US×LED -48.82 -75.06 -73.68 
 (157.0) (125.8) (120.4) 
POST×LED 270.4*** 296.6*** 295.2*** 
 (83.00) (79.16) (80.26) 
US×LED 73.77 73.77 73.77 
 (80.59) (75.20) (63.11) 
US -1,314*** -826.2*** -934.0*** 
 (233.6) (238.2) (263.7) 
POST -165.9** -115.9** -132.0 
 (83.01) (50.63) (83.86) 
POST×US 220.8* 189.5** 210.7** 
 (114.1) (89.21) (94.90) 
RD&D 2.313*** 1.563*** 1.692*** 
 (0.401) (0.403) (0.440) 
Electricity price 0.447* 0.665 0.304 
 (0.256) (0.539) (0.455) 
Electricity consumption 7.659 -1.393 -2.371 
 (7.688) (5.960) (7.322) 
GDP 40.20*** 6.037 24.00 
 (14.43) (8.511) (18.45) 
Constant -96.08** -136.5 -76.44 
 (45.71) (95.47) (77.45) 
Year FE YES NO YES 
Country FE NO YES YES 
Observations 428 428 428 
R-squared 0.458 0.538 0.550 
Notes: 
1. POST indicates after the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 
2. The U.S. indicates those whose inventor country location is the United States. 
3. Observations indicate the number of countries multiplied by the number of years 
4. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 23. The impact of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 on domestic patenting:  
policy uncertainty 
 YEAR FE Country FE Year/Country FE 
 (1) (2) (3) 
POL_UNCERTAINTY×US×LED -131.5 -157.3 -155.3 
 (214.7) (191.8) (169.3) 
POL_UNCERTAINTY ×LED 211.4*** 237.2*** 235.2*** 
 (63.74) (63.87) (64.35) 
US×LED 95.33 95.33 95.33 
 (75.87) (70.86) (61.09) 
US -1,279*** -771.7*** -900.8*** 
 (221.3) (213.0) (238.1) 
POL_UNCERTAINTY -120.5 -100.3** -99.11 
 (77.77) (44.95) (77.28) 
POL_UNCERTAINTY ×US 68.06 86.87 80.07 
 (133.4) (117.1) (101.3) 
RD&D 2.294*** 1.548*** 1.658*** 
 (0.393) (0.376) (0.410) 
Electricity price 0.355 1.154** 0.135 
 (0.247) (0.470) (0.394) 
Electricity consumption 8.996 -2.489 -0.867 
 (7.359) (5.829) (6.982) 
GDP 36.59*** 9.995 21.27 
 (13.62) (9.701) (16.88) 
Constant -86.89** -217.6** -59.24 
 (43.33) (88.66) (69.53) 
Year FE YES NO YES 
Country FE NO YES YES 
Observations 428 428 428 
R-squared 0.448 0.527 0.541 
Notes: 
1. POL_UNCERTAINTY equals 1 if the year of application is between 2001 and 2004. 
2. The U.S. indicates those whose inventor country location is the United States. 
3. Observations indicate the number of countries multiplied by the number of years 
4. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 14. Total RD&D 
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Table 24. Correlation Matrix (Full Sample) 
 
Filing year US JP KR RDD RDD1 RDD2 Elec_price Elec_con GDP 
Filing year 1 
         
US -0.0482 1 
        
JP -0.1619 -0.345 1 
       
KR 0.3137 -0.1227 -0.5541 1 
      
RDD 0.0005 0.2941 0.6847 -0.5258 1 
     
RDD1 0.0579 0.2808 0.6712 -0.5338 0.9597 1 
    
RDD2 0.1307 0.2998 0.6341 -0.5295 0.9054 0.9597 1 
   
Elec_price 0.238 -0.4993 0.5761 -0.4078 0.221 0.2488 0.2567 1 
  
Elec_con -0.0152 -0.0112 -0.1531 0.4316 -0.1934 -0.2822 -0.2238 -0.2667 1 
 
GDP 0.4233 0.133 -0.6275 0.725 -0.4874 -0.4241 -0.3686 -0.3634 0.2543 1 
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CHAPTER 4. GASOLINE PRICES, BELIEFS, AND THE ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY 
4.1 Introduction 
Energy issues and greenhouse gas emissions present the current generation with 
intertwined challenges. One partial response to these obstacles is the development and 
deployment of more energy-efficient vehicles such as hybrid or plug-in hybrid vehicles. 
However, recent low gasoline prices pose challenges to consumers who may adopt alternative 
vehicles. For example, deliveries of plug-in electric vehicles in the United States decreased 17 
percent in 2015 compared to 2014, possibly due to the lower price of gasoline at the pump. To 
increase the number of alternative vehicles to a level that could have a meaningful impact on 
climate change requires an understanding of how consumers’ belief on future gasoline prices 
affect the willingness to buy more fuel-efficient vehicles. 
Compared to electricity prices, gasoline prices are more visible to the consumer since we 
can easily see the price at gas stations and are frequently exposed to gas prices on radios or 
televisions. So, obtaining gasoline price information is not costly. Given this information, it is 
plausible that consumers form future gasoline price beliefs. Anderson, Kellogg, and Sallee 
(2013) and Allcott (2011) showed that consumers could make reasonable forecasts of average 
future energy prices which means that tomorrow’s gasoline price would be the same as today’s 
price. The same assumption was made in the automobile economics literature (Kahn, 1986; 
Bento, Li, & Roth, 2012; Klier & Linn, 2012). Gallsagher and Muehlegger (2011) also made the 
same assumption when they calculated implicit discount rates. Regardless of whether this 
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assumption is valid or not76, if people form future gasoline price beliefs (Manski, 2004), these 
beliefs may affect their willingness to buy more energy-efficient cars.  
Theoretically, different scholars proposed numerous theories that explain the 
consumption of environmentally friendly goods. A traditional neo-classical economics theory 
posits rational human actors who aim to maximize their own utilities when they make decisions 
about energy-efficient technologies. On the other hand, the most frequently used theory in social 
sciences is the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) which posits that behavioral intentions are a 
function of a belief about the likelihood of a particular outcome (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; 
Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). 
Along the similar lines, Kahneman (2002) explained two types of cognitive processes. 
The first type is an intuitive one, in which a person makes choices without forming an explicit 
belief. The second type is a rational cognitive process, which requires forming an explicit future 
belief, and then a consumer makes a decision based on this belief. It is still arguable which type 
applies to forming beliefs on prices, but it is possible that a consumer goes through the second 
cognitive process, especially in the automobile market. 
This mechanism is shown in a variety of different contexts (Bollinger, Leslie, & 
Sorensen, 2011; Jensen, 2010). Hensher (1982) argued that future gasoline price perception 
could be a significant factor in the adoption of electric vehicles. Particularly, Curtin, Shrago, and 
Mikkelsen (2009) found that higher future gas prices are associated with a higher likelihood of 
buying plug-in hybrid vehicles, using the Michigan Survey of Consumers. However, their study 
                                                 
76 Anderson, Kellogg, and Sallee (2013) argued that this is a valid assumption. 
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is not clear about the difference between five-year/one-year future expected gasoline prices in 
regard to the likelihood of buying a hybrid vehicle which is the primary goal of this chapter. 
Here we can ask the following question: which one, five-year expected prices or one-year 
expected prices, better predicts the likelihood of buying more fuel-efficient cars? 
This paper investigates whether future gasoline price beliefs affect the willingness to 
purchase more fuel-efficient vehicles, such as hybrid and plug-in hybrid vehicles. Relatively few 
studies focus on how consumers’ future expectations of gas prices affect their willingness to 
consider alternative vehicles. If people have a perception of low future gasoline prices, it 
increases the consumer’s payback period which negatively impacts return on investment (ROI). 
Therefore, people are less likely to buy more fuel-efficient cars. This study can fill the gap in 
understanding consumers’ attitudes toward the future cost of gasoline prices and their purchasing 
intention on more fuel-efficient vehicles. Though revealed preference methods are better than 
stated preference methods because people reveal their values with their behaviors, the limitations 
of stated preference research design is obvious: What people say is not the same as what they 
actually do (Train, 2009). However, using this unique dataset will allow us to explore 
meaningful research questions. 
It is widely acknowledged that if the price of gasoline increases, the demand for gasoline 
decreases. Extensive studies have discovered the price elasticity of demand for petrol. Goodwin, 
Dargay, and Hanly (2004) summarized sixty-nine published literature of the price elasticity of 
demand for gasoline, and present price elasticity ranges from 0.00 to -1.81 depending on the 
estimation method and data. Wadud, Graham, and Noland (2010) estimate the short-run price 
elasticity of demand ranges from -0.03 to -0.34, which is an inelastic demand in the short run, as 
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we already know. Concerning the elasticity of supply, fuel taxes, and fuel economy standards 
assume the price elasticity of supply of 2.0, which comes from a U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) report. Coyle, DeBacker, and Prisinzano (2012) have provided both the 
price elasticity of demand and supply of gasoline using the same data source and compatible 
models. This study found that demand elasticities are in line with the previous literature, and the 
price elasticity of supply is 0.29, which differs from the common assumption of a perfectly 
inelastic short-run supply curve. Literature about the sensitivity of gasoline consumption to 
changes in prices has been investigated by Dahl and Sterner (1991) and Greene, Kahn, and 
Gibson (1999). 
These initial studies provide the fundamental understanding of the sensitivity of 
consumer behaviors to the change of gasoline prices. Most found that higher gas prices lead to 
increased demand for smaller, more fuel-efficient cars, especially if higher gas prices are 
sustained (Congressional Budget Office, 2008). Higher gas prices would influence consumers’ 
automobile purchasing habits in the long run. As an example, it was empirically proven that the 
market share of light trucks decreased between 2004 (55% of the passenger vehicle market) and 
2006 (52% of the passenger vehicle market) due to the increase in gasoline price. The longer the 
gas prices remain high; the more likely consumers are to switch their overall automobile 
purchasing behaviors. Consumers might switch their vehicles to more fuel-efficient vehicles if 
the price of gasoline remains higher than the historical average price.  Li, Haefen, and Timmins 
(2008) also showed that high gasoline price affects the purchase of more fuel-efficient vehicles 
and speeds the scrapping of less fuel-efficient vehicles. 
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However, other studies have argued that the impact of higher gasoline prices on 
purchasing fuel-efficient vehicles may not be as significant as once thought. It might be that 
uncertainties about future fuel savings are considerable barriers to the purchase of fuel-efficient 
vehicles (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). That is, consumers are reluctant to buy fuel-efficient 
vehicles unless the return is sufficiently high and the payback time is short. Allcott and Wozny 
(2009) found that people underestimate future gas costs when they purchase automobiles and 
weigh immediate losses more heavily than future gains in uncertain situations; thus, the 
probability of loss (the initial electric vehicle price) is usually exaggerated (Kahneman & 
Knetsch, 1991). As a rule of thumb, consumers usually count losses approximately twice as 
much as gains when they make decisions (DellaVigna, 2007). Furthermore, consumers have a 
very low awareness of how much fuel they use over time (Turrentine & Kurani, 2007). Unless 
future gasoline prices rise so dramatically that people can easily envision future fuel savings, 
they are less likely to consider purchasing more fuel-efficient vehicles because they do not fully 
account for the benefit of future fuel savings. 
In this paper, we find significant evidence that current gasoline prices matter in regard to 
the willingness to buy hybrid vehicles. Further, we find that the long-term future gas price beliefs 
have more of an impact on buying hybrid vehicles than the short-term gas price beliefs. Since 
price incentive works, this finding is relevant to the policy rationale for a gasoline tax. The rest 
of the paper is organized as follows. First, the survey data are described. Second, we describe the 
methods and model specification. Third, we provide the results and discussion. Fourth, we 
address the implications and then conclude. 
4.2 Methods 
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4.2.1 Data 
We pooled monthly data from the Michigan Survey of Consumers (MSC)77 that was 
conducted from July 2008 to November 2008. It is well known for eliciting beliefs on future 
economic conditions and widely used. The survey involved telephone sampling from a 
representative sample of 500 U.S. households each month. This survey data was previously used 
in Anderson et al., (2013). Missing values and “refused” responses reduced the sample size to 
1211. For other variables, we considered “don’t know” as at least some kind of answer, so we 
did not consider it as a purely missing value. We dropped all observations that included “don’t 
know” and “N/A.” We discussed the treatment of purely missing values in robustness checks. 
 This survey data has panel components because one-third of the respondents re-
participated six months later, one-third of the interviewees were never surveyed again, and one-
third were participants six months earlier. However, the study periods of this paper have cross-
sectional components because no one re-participated again during five months. 
 The key dependent variable in the model is the response to the question:  
- Hybrid 1: On a scale from zero to one hundred, where zero means that you would 
definitely not buy and one hundred means you definitely would buy, what are the 
chances that you might buy a hybrid vehicle sometime in the future? 
 
                                                 
77 We obtained the raw data from the survey from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). 
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- Plug-in 1: On a scale from zero to one hundred, where zero means that you would 
definitely not buy and one hundred means you definitely would buy, what are the 
chances that you might buy a plug-in hybrid vehicle sometime in the future? 
The beauty of this survey is additional survey questions which include more information 
on the future fuel savings. With more information related to cost savings, it is plausible that a 
survey participant may calculate the future fuel savings better than before. It may affect the 
willingness to consider hybrid or plug-in hybrid vehicles. Follow-up questions are as follows: 
- Hybrid 2: If a hybrid vehicle reduced total fuel costs by twenty-five percent and the 
vehicle itself costs one thousand five hundred dollars more than an ordinary vehicle, 
what are the chances that you might buy a hybrid vehicle, using the same scale 
ranging from zero to one hundred, where zero means that you would definitely not 
buy and one hundred means you definitely would buy sometime in the future? 
- Plug-in 2: If a plug-in hybrid reduced total fuel costs by seventy-five percent and cost 
two thousand five hundred dollars more than an ordinary vehicle, what are the 
chances you might buy the plug-in hybrid, using the scale ranging from zero to one 
hundred, where zero means you would definitely not buy and one hundred means you 
definitely would buy? 
- Plug-in 3: What if a plug-in hybrid that reduced total fuel costs by seventy-five 
percent cost five thousand dollars more than an ordinary vehicle, what are the chances 
you might buy the plug-in hybrid, using the scale ranging from zero to one hundred, 
where zero means that you would Definitely not buy and one hundred means you 
definitely would buy? 
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- Plug-in 4: What if a plug-in hybrid that reduced total fuel costs by seventy-five 
percent cost ten thousand dollars more than an ordinary vehicle, what are the chances 
you might buy the plug-in hybrid, using the scale ranging from zero to one hundred, 
where zero means that you would Definitely not buy and one hundred means you 
definitely would buy? 
Table 25 shows summary statistics for the entire questionnaires. The dependent variable 
is the likelihood of buying a hybrid or plug-in hybrid vehicle. The event is considered as a 
probability that an individual would buy these vehicles. If we compare Hybrid 1 and Plug-in 1, 
survey participants would prefer a hybrid to a plug-in hybrid vehicle. As one might guess, 
participants who answered while having received the more precise information on future 
gasoline price were slightly more likely to buy hybrid vehicles. Once more information on future 
gasoline prices was given to respondents of the plug-in hybrid vehicle question, the probability 
of buying plug-in hybrid vehicles increased. Among Plug-in 2 and Plug-in 4 questionnaires, the 
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Table 25. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables      
V1208_mod (Hybrid 1) 1,222 0.623257 0.304363 0 1 
V1209_mod (Hybrid 2) 1,222 0.667177 0.280539 0 1 
V1210_mod (Plug-in 1) 1,222 0.566776 0.286625 0 1 
V1211_mod (Plug-in 2) 1,222 0.630655 0.258926 0.01 1 
V1212_mod (Plug-in 3) 1,222 0.438175 0.25384 0.01 1 
V1213_mod (Plug-in 4) 1,222 0.203429 0.232507 0 1 
Independent Variables      
E_PX5 1,222 1.875614 1.35781 1 5 
E_PX1 1,222 2.230769 1.38936 1 5 
Gasoline Price 1,222 3.422274 0.68121 2.012992 4.278 
AGE 1,222 49.28969 14.15595 18 91 
AGESQ 1,222 2629.7 1437.682 324 8281 
GENDER 1,222 1.518003 0.49988 1 2 
RACE 1,222 1.256137 0.760851 1 5 
NUMADT 1,222 1.968085 0.71703 1 6 
NUMKID 1,222 0.774141 1.133101 0 8 
MARRY 1,222 1.923077 1.476202 1 6 
ENVIRONMENTALISM 1,222 1.729133 1.00014 1 5 
LOCATION_PARKING 1,222 2.743863 1.541357 1 6 
Log(income) 1,222 11.22614 0.750458 8.36637 13.81551 
TYPES OF VEHICLES 1,222 2.052373 1.26201 1 4 
VEHNUM 1,222 2.279869 1.126803 1 13 
AVG. MILES 
DRIVEN/DAY 
1,222 32.71931 35.74304 1 400 
*The current gasoline price: U.S. monthly retail gasoline and diesel Prices including taxes (dollars per gallon).
78
 
The key independent variable is the current gasoline price. We use the monthly retail 
gasoline and diesel Prices including taxes (dollars per gallon).79 Since there is Census Division 
information in the survey data, we can match between EIA region and Census division using 
                                                 
78 http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_gnd_a_epm0u_pte_dpgal_m.htm 
79 http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_gnd_a_epm0u_pte_dpgal_m.htm 
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Table 32. If Census division includes multiple EIA regions, we take the average of gasoline 
prices. For example, Census region 5 includes both PADD 1B and PADD 1C so that we take the 
average gasoline price of each EIA region. We use the survey month and year as a matching 
criterion  in Table 33 includes monthly retail gasoline and diesel prices per EIA region. 
When it comes to the monthly average future gasoline price perception, there is a clear 
distinction between the average price expectation of five years and one year. It is arguable 
whether the expected gasoline price is in nominal or real terms. Anderson et al. (2013) assume 
that respondents answer in nominal terms. Figure 18 illuminates the decreasing trend of the one-
year average price expectation as parallel with the current gasoline price. On the contrary, the 
average of the five-year gasoline price perception was relatively flat. In the long run, consumers 
tended to have a relatively constant future price expectation even if the price plummeted. To 
obtain the expected future gasoline perception for one-year and five-year, we added the current 
gasoline price and the average price expectation of five years and one year, as below:80 
 𝐸(𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1) = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠,𝑡+1 (9) 
 𝐸(𝑃𝑖,𝑡+5) = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠,𝑡+5 (10) 
Where 𝑖 indicates a household and 𝑡 indicates time 
                                                 
80 Attari (2010) adpoted the multilevel regression model to estimate participants’ perceptions on energy usage/savings as a 
function of actual energy usage/savings. 
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To put gasoline prices and the level of gasoline prices into a common unit, we multiply 
by Consumer Price Index (CPI) using a base period as for July 2008.81 Among different CPIs, we 
use “cuur0000sa0l1e: All items less food and energy.” 
shows the correlation among gasoline prices. There is a significant correlation between 
the current gasoline price and the expected future gasoline belief so that we run the below 
econometric model separately. 
4.2.2 Model Specifications 
First, we run the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression and check the in-sample 
prediction. Since the dependent variable ranges from 0 to 1, the predicted values of the OLS are 
out of the range 0-1. So, we use non-linear models to estimate the constructed models. If we use 
a logit or probit model, we need to convert a dependent variable to a binary variable. There is no 
reason to discard information. 
For a proportional dependent variable data, we use generalized linear models (GLM) with 
a log-link relationship (McCullagh & Nelder, 1989)82. Table 5 shows the coding mechanism of 
independent variables. We construct a model as below: 
 𝐸(𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔|𝑋𝑖,1,,………𝑋𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 (11) 
   
                                                 
81 http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?cu 
82 Papke and Wooldridge (1996) suggested direct models for solving the above issue by applying the method of quasi-maximum 
likelihood estimation (QMLE). So we can use a fractional probit model to obtain consistent estimators of the efficient conditional 
mean parameters. However, we do not use it because the dependent variables are not generated from aggregated binary variables. 
http://www.stata.com/manuals14/rfracreg.pdf 
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Where i indexes a household and t indexes month. Ki,t indicates Pi,t, E(Pi,t+1), E(Pi,t+5) in (1) and 
(2),  Xi,t indicates a vector of control variables: Age, Gender, Race, Number of Adults, Number 
of Kids, Marry, Environmentalism, Recharge at home/no, need to go gas station, Parking 
location, Log(Income), Type of Vehicles, Number of Vehicles, Average Miles Driven per day. 
ui,t indicates residuals.  
Another important aspect of this study lies in its attempt to estimate the effect of regional 
differences in the willingness to purchase hybrid/plug-in hybrid vehicles. This is a legitimate 
argument that people experience different incentives for hybrid/plug-in hybrid vehicles which 
may affect an individual’s likelihood to buy a more fuel-efficient car. Therefore, we control for 
time-invariant regional dummies. 
We used the Survey (Svy) command in STATA to create the design elements of the 
survey because the national sampling of dwelling units was selected by area probability 
sampling. The household weights were used to yield a representative sample of all households. 
The population was partitioned into crossing census divisions by MSA/non-MSA strata. 
Additionally, we consider “n/a” responses as missing values and dropped them. In order to fill 
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Table 26. Coding of Independent Variables 
Variable Coding 
Gas Prices up/down next 5 years Go up (1), Stay the same (3), Go down (5) 
Gas Prices up/down next 1 years Go up (1), Stay the same (3), Go down (5) 
The Current Gasoline Price $/gallon 
Age 18-91 years old 
Gender Male (1), Female (2) 
Race White (1), Black (2), Hispanic (3), African 
Indian/Alaskan native (4), Asian/Pacific 
Islander (5) 
Number of Adults 1-6 
Number of Kids 0-8 
Marry Married (1), Separated (2), Divorced (3), 
Widowed (4), Never Married (5), Married, 
but spouse away in service (6), NA (9) 
Environmentalism Very important (1), somewhat important (2), 
neither (3), not very important (4), not at all 
important (5) 
Parking location Attached garage (1), unattached garage (2), 
carport (3), driveway or lot (4), street (5), 
nearby lot or structure (6) 
Log(Income) $4,300-$999,995 or more (current dollars) 
Type of Vehicle Car (1), pickup/truck (2), van (3), SUV (4) 
Number of Vehicles 1-13 
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4.3 Estimation Results 
Table 27 shows hybrid vehicle estimation results. First, column (4) shows significant 
results of gasoline prices’ effect on the willingness to buy hybrid vehicles once more information 
is given to a participant at the 0.05 significance level. Second, column (6) indicates significant 
results of five-year future perception on the willingness to buy hybrid vehicles at the 0.05 
significance level. Third, column (1) and (3) show the effect of both five-year future perception 
and the current gasoline price are only significant at the 10% level. We could argue that when 
more information on fuel saving of a hybrid vehicle is provided to a participant, we can have a 
statistically significant finding. 
Table 28 shows the estimation results on plug-in hybrid vehicle. We did not find any 
evidence to support either the current gasoline price’s or future gasoline price perception’s effect 
on the likelihood of buying plug-in hybrid vehicles. A possible explanation is that it is due to a 
systematic difference between hybrid vehicles and plug-in hybrid vehicles. Unlike hybrid 
vehicles, plug-in hybrid vehicles also use rechargeable batteries, which make them less reliant on 
gasoline. So it is plausible that consumers are less resilient to the gasoline price changes’ or the 
future price perception’s effect on the willingness to buy plug-in hybrid vehicles.   
Table 29 shows marginal effects. Column (1) shows 1% that a decrease of gasoline price 
decreases the probability of buying a hybrid vehicle by 15.1 %, holding the other variables at 
their means. The most salient factor is that the magnitude of five-year and one-year future 
gasoline price beliefs are lower than the current gasoline price. So, if we assume a no-change 
forecast of future gasoline price, it overestimates the effect of gasoline price.
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gasolineprice 0.123*   0.151**   
 (0.0711)   (0.0717)   
E_PX1  0.0615   0.0676*  
  (0.0402)   (0.0407)  
E_PX5   0.103*   0.139** 
   (0.0624)   (0.0631) 
AGE 0.0298 0.0285 0.0300 0.0455** 0.0440** 0.0457** 
 (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0191) 
AGESQ -0.000433** -0.000420** -0.000433** -0.000587*** -0.000573*** -0.000587*** 
 (0.000177) (0.000177) (0.000177) (0.000179) (0.000179) (0.000179) 
V1625 0.0431 0.0370 0.0401 0.0412 0.0338 0.0375 
 (0.0976) (0.0977) (0.0976) (0.0987) (0.0987) (0.0987) 
RACE -0.00519 -0.00567 -0.00499 -0.0442 -0.0450 -0.0438 
 (0.0462) (0.0462) (0.0462) (0.0466) (0.0466) (0.0466) 
NUMADT -0.0587 -0.0601 -0.0570 -0.0828 -0.0836 -0.0811 
 (0.0791) (0.0792) (0.0791) (0.0796) (0.0797) (0.0796) 
NUMKID 0.0232 0.0225 0.0229 0.0203 0.0196 0.0200 
 (0.0207) (0.0203) (0.0206) (0.0198) (0.0194) (0.0197) 
MARRY 0.00695 0.00643 0.00945 -0.00700 -0.00735 -0.00384 
 (0.0371) (0.0371) (0.0371) (0.0374) (0.0374) (0.0374) 
V1219 -0.288*** -0.286*** -0.288*** -0.300*** -0.299*** -0.300*** 
 (0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0413) (0.0413) 
V1216 0.00697 0.00657 0.00576 -0.000972 -0.00104 -0.00286 
 (0.0331) (0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0335) 
income_ln 0.287*** 0.297*** 0.294*** 0.338*** 0.349*** 0.347*** 
 (0.0701) (0.0702) (0.0701) (0.0707) (0.0708) (0.0708) 
V1111 -0.00628 -0.00705 -0.00666 -0.0156 -0.0167 -0.0159 
 (0.0352) (0.0352) (0.0352) (0.0357) (0.0356) (0.0357) 
VEHNUM -0.0160 -0.0155 -0.0159 -0.00640 -0.00574 -0.00626 
 (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0178) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0166) 
V1201 -2.76e-05 -2.81e-05 -3.15e-05 -0.000177 -0.000178 -0.000183 
 (0.000224) (0.000224) (0.000224) (0.000227) (0.000227) (0.000227) 
Constant -3.029*** -2.897*** -3.063***    
 (1.023) (1.011) (1.030)    
Constant    -3.789*** -3.591*** -3.880*** 
    (1.034) (1.021) (1.043) 
REGION FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 28. Estimation Results (Plug-in Hybrid Vehicles) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
gasolineprice 0.0247   0.0139   0.00921   0.0342   
 (0.0721)   (0.0727)   (0.0812)   (0.105)   
E_PX1  -0.00207   -0.0171   -0.00588   -0.00301  
  (0.0404)   (0.0407)   (0.0462)   (0.0597)  
E_PX5   0.0308   0.0183   0.00580   0.000335 
   (0.0631)   (0.0635)   (0.0714)   (0.0921) 
AGE 0.0367* 0.0367* 0.0367* 0.0382* 0.0386** 0.0382* -0.000169 -0.000218 -0.000180 -0.00748 -0.00772 -0.00775 
 (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0288) (0.0288) (0.0288) 
AGESQ -0.000449** -0.000450** -0.000450** -0.000522*** -0.000526*** -0.000522*** -0.000129 -0.000128 -0.000129 -7.99e-06 -5.26e-06 -5.01e-06 
 (0.000182) (0.000182) (0.000182) (0.000184) (0.000184) (0.000184) (0.000215) (0.000215) (0.000215) (0.000282) (0.000282) (0.000282) 
V1625 -0.0978 -0.0982 -0.0984 -0.148 -0.147 -0.148 0.0188 0.0186 0.0186 0.0233 0.0224 0.0224 
 (0.0986) (0.0986) (0.0986) (0.0994) (0.0994) (0.0993) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) 
RACE 0.0127 0.0122 0.0130 0.00680 0.00614 0.00698 0.0401 0.0398 0.0401 0.106* 0.106* 0.106* 
 (0.0477) (0.0477) (0.0477) (0.0479) (0.0479) (0.0479) (0.0506) (0.0505) (0.0506) (0.0575) (0.0575) (0.0575) 
NUMADT 0.00514 0.00622 0.00517 -0.0252 -0.0231 -0.0253 0.000957 0.00155 0.00106 0.0482 0.0495 0.0492 
 (0.0832) (0.0832) (0.0832) (0.0803) (0.0803) (0.0803) (0.0874) (0.0875) (0.0874) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) 
NUMKID 0.00979 0.00965 0.00979 0.00643 0.00627 0.00643 0.00905 0.00896 0.00902 -0.00523 -0.00547 -0.00545 
 (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0252) (0.0253) (0.0253) 
MARRY -0.0118 -0.0114 -0.0112 -0.0205 -0.0198 -0.0201 -0.00666 -0.00647 -0.00653 0.00275 0.00317 0.00310 
 (0.0374) (0.0374) (0.0374) (0.0375) (0.0376) (0.0375) (0.0417) (0.0417) (0.0417) (0.0527) (0.0528) (0.0527) 
V1219 -0.197*** -0.197*** -0.197*** -0.210*** -0.211*** -0.210*** -0.103* -0.103* -0.103* -0.146** -0.146** -0.146** 
 (0.0467) (0.0467) (0.0467) (0.0466) (0.0466) (0.0466) (0.0546) (0.0546) (0.0546) (0.0735) (0.0736) (0.0736) 
V1218 -0.314*** -0.314*** -0.314*** -0.345*** -0.345*** -0.344*** -0.145** -0.146** -0.145** -0.0968 -0.0975 -0.0974 
 (0.0578) (0.0578) (0.0578) (0.0580) (0.0580) (0.0580) (0.0739) (0.0739) (0.0739) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) 
V1216 -0.0151 -0.0143 -0.0157 -0.0168 -0.0155 -0.0171 -0.0197 -0.0191 -0.0196 -0.0257 -0.0245 -0.0247 
 (0.0333) (0.0333) (0.0334) (0.0336) (0.0337) (0.0337) (0.0370) (0.0370) (0.0370) (0.0473) (0.0473) (0.0473) 
income_ln 0.197*** 0.198*** 0.199*** 0.295*** 0.294*** 0.296*** 0.189** 0.188** 0.189** 0.156 0.156 0.156 
 (0.0707) (0.0708) (0.0707) (0.0714) (0.0715) (0.0714) (0.0796) (0.0797) (0.0796) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) 
V1111 0.0117 0.0112 0.0117 -0.00264 -0.00311 -0.00258 -0.00965 -0.00977 -0.00969 -0.000718 -0.00129 -0.00123 
 (0.0357) (0.0357) (0.0357) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0395) (0.0395) (0.0395) (0.0503) (0.0503) (0.0503) 
VEHNUM -0.0387 -0.0385 -0.0388 -0.0192 -0.0189 -0.0192 -0.0149 -0.0148 -0.0149 -0.00933 -0.00910 -0.00912 
 (0.0382) (0.0382) (0.0382) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0243) (0.0243) (0.0243) 
V1201 -0.000411* -0.000410* -0.000412* -0.000226 -0.000225 -0.000227 -4.89e-05 -4.88e-05 -4.89e-05 -0.000196 -0.000195 -0.000195 
 (0.000239) (0.000239) (0.000240) (0.000237) (0.000236) (0.000237) (0.000272) (0.000272) (0.000272) (0.000371) (0.000371) (0.000371) 
Constant -1.769* -1.681* -1.817* -2.371** -2.255** -2.402** -1.639 -1.578 -1.633 -2.349 -2.211 -2.227 
 (1.033) (1.020) (1.040) (1.040) (1.028) (1.048) (1.162) (1.147) (1.172) (1.494) (1.473) (1.507) 
REGION FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 29. Marginal Effects83 (Hybrid Vehicles) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Marginal effects Marginal effects Marginal effects 
Gasoline price 0.151**   
 (0.0717)   
E_PX1  0.0676*  
  (0.0407)  
E_PX5   0.139** 
   (0.0631) 
Constant -3.789*** -3.591*** -3.880*** 
 (1.034) (1.021) (1.043) 
1. Standard errors in parentheses 
2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
As a robustness check, we dropped “don’t’ know” answers and performed multiple 
imputation to fill the remaining missing portion of the data. We found consistent results that 
there was a significant result in the Hybrid 2 questionnaire. 
The modeling results also indicate a statistically significant effect of environmentalism. 
Several studies found that a pro-environmental attitude is positively related to purchasing 
environmentally friendly vehicles (Gadenne, Sharma, Kerr, & Smith, 2011). Environmentalists 
are more likely to protect the environment, even if they have to pay a few extra dollars for the 
initial purchase of an eco-friendly car. It has been empirically proven that environmentalists are 
more likely than non-environmentalists to buy hybrid vehicles (M. E. Kahn, 2007) and electric 
vehicles (Hidrue, Parsons, Kempton, & Gardner, 2011). According to Deloitte (2011), a green 
lifestyle positively affects the intention to purchase electric vehicles. Recent surveys found that 
environmentally friendly and tech-savvy consumers are more interested in purchasing electric 
                                                 
83 The average marginal effect follows the same pattern. 
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vehicles (Deloitte, 2011). This argument can be extended to “lifestyle theory”(Walker & Li, 
2007; Axsen, Bailey, & Castro, 2015) which affects alternative-vehicle choice. 
We also find that a charging station at home is a significant factor, which is consistent 
with previous literature (Yamashita, Miimura, Takamori, Wang, & Yokoyama, 2013). Most 
literature regarding the willingness to buy plug-in hybrid vehicles concentrate on the limitation 
of plug-in hybrid vehicles such as limited driving range. For example, most electric vehicles can 
only go about 100 miles before needing to be recharged, and fully recharging the battery 4-8 
hours (U.S. EPA, 2012). Seminal studies about limitations of electric vehicles were conducted by 
Calfee (1985) and Beggs (1981). Both studies established concern over the vehicle’s maximum 
driving range as the primary obstacle to adopting electric vehicles. Subsequently, Bunch, 
Bradley, and Golob (1993), and Brownstone, Bunch, and Train (2000) concluded that limited 
driving range, long charging time, and high initial vehicle price were the primary barriers for 
consumers. More recently, Singer (2016) found that 56 % of survey respondents are willing to 
purchase electric vehicles if an electric vehicle could travel 300 miles on a single charge. 
Needlessly to say, young and higher income leads to higher likelihood of buying more 
fuel-efficient cars. This is also consistent with previous studies. Higher income leads to new and 
domestic vehicle purchasing, whereas those with lower incomes are more likely to purchase used 
and Japanese vehicles (Roorda, Mohammadian, & Miller, 2000). Additionally, lower-income 
people are more apt to buy small cars while people with higher incomes are associated with 
luxury vehicles, minivans, and SUVs (Sports Utility Vehicles). This is an important policy 
implication since lower and unevenly distributed income is an obstacle to the adoption of more 
fuel-efficient cars (Erdem, Şentürk, & Şimşek, 2010).  
   
   105
Additionally, younger drivers are more likely to drive small cars, middle-aged people are 
more apt to select minivans and pickups, and older people are more liable to choose large and 
luxury vehicles. In particular, younger male consumers prefer electric vehicles (Ziegler, 2010). 
The limitation of this research is that we could not test how long the gasoline price takes 
to diffuse to consumers because we only had one-year and five-year future price expectations 
compared to the current price. It would be interesting to test the argument of the delayed 
diffusion of “sticky information” (Mankiw & Reis, 2002). 
4.4 Payback Periods 
 It is hard to calculate the precise amount of lifetime fuel cost savings as indicated in 
Sallee (2013). Consumers should consider the following future fuel cost savings: 
 









Where t=0 indicates today, T is the lifespan of the vehicle, 𝛿is the discount rate, P is the price of 
gasoline per gallon, m is the number of miles driven, mpg is miles per gallon. 
As Sallee (2013) addressed, many people do not know which discount rate they employ, 
the number of miles driven, etc. Even if consumers have full information on the above variables, 
it is not easy to calculate the lifetime fuel costs when they take a survey. To make matters worse, 
people usually pay less attention when completing survey questionnaires. Therefore, a full 
calculation of the above equation seems impossible. 
   
   106
Sixty households in California illustrate no evidence of an economically rational 
decision-making process regarding fuel economy (Kurani & Turrentine, 2004). Nine out of sixty 
households stated that they account for fuel economy when they purchase a new car. None of 
them has tried to do a quantitative analysis about future fuel cost saving. It implies that personal 
decisions toward buying a vehicle about fuel economy are not based on sound rational decision. 
It is often rational for consumers to pay limited attention to energy efficiency when they 
purchase energy durable goods (Sallee, 2013). 
Allcott and Wozny (2009) argued that consumers underestimate future gas costs when 
they purchase an automobile. Their finding is that consumers’ underestimation of future gasoline 
cost implies that people truly care less about the future fuel savings when they buy a car. Allcott 
and Wozny (2009) failed to provide the reason why certain groups of people are less likely to be 
influenced by the future cost of gasoline when they purchase new vehicles. Sallee (2013) 
suggested the idea of rational inattention in energy economics and made a valuable contribution 
to the idea of rational inattention, particularly in the automobile market. However, it is still 
arguable that rational inattention is a subset of the notion of bounded rationality. Also, Larrick 
and Soll (2008) showed that U.S. consumers believe that equal increases in MPG are the same in 
gas savings which is called as the MPG illusion. While both MPG and Gallon Per Miles (GPM) 
convey useful information to consumers, GPM is more useful when consumers are buying a car 
because it can better capture fuel consumption information than MPG. 
Possible explanations for why people usually underestimate future gasoline costs when 
they purchase a new vehicle are 1) consumers put little value in the future; 2) for consumers who 
are not interested in fuel economy, because fuel economy is bundled with another attribute of 
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cars, consumers are uncertain that the fuel savings are represented correctly. In standard 
economic modeling, we typically assume exponential discounting; people discount the future 
prices at a constant fraction. However, the discount rate is the problem of choice, as it may differ 
from person to person. When we compare the total lifetime cost of a more fuel-efficient vehicle 
with a conventional vehicle, the selection of the discount rate is significant. Taking into 
consideration the typical three-year payback period of a new automobile, a 30~40% discount rate 
is a reasonable assumption for comparing the cost of both vehicles.  
 Given these constraints, people may be forced to rely on rough information provided in 
the survey questionnaires. Participants may think as if they are rational given the limited 
information provided. For example, hybrid 2 survey question allows people to roughly calculate 
the future fuel savings by providing the following information: 
- A hybrid vehicle reduced total fuel costs by twenty-five percent 
- Cost of vehicle: one thousand five hundred dollars more than an ordinary vehicle 
The current year’s fuel saving can be calculated by assuming 13,476 miles driven per 
year.84 According to the U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA), Americans drive 13,476 miles per year on average. The number of years driven is 
assumed to be 12 years.85 Note that the cost of the vehicle is $1,500 more than the conventional 
vehicle. Assume that miles per gallon (MPG) is 29 based on the least powerful non-hybrid 
Civic (1.81 engine) (Kelly Sims Gallagher & Muehlegger, 2011). When it comes to a discount 
rate, Hausman (1979) estimates that consumers use a 20% discount rate when they purchase 
                                                 
84 http://cars.lovetoknow.com/about-cars/how-many-miles-do-americans-drive-per-year 
85 http://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/28/americans-holding-onto-their-cars-longer-than-ever.html 
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energy durable goods. So, we assume 3%, 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20% discount rates, respectively, 
to show the sensitivity of results. Dreyfus & Viscusi's (1995) estimated discount rate in an 
automobile is 11%~17%. It is within the range of the above assumption. Payback periods of a 
hybrid vehicle are calculated as below.  
Given the uncertainty in these findings, Table 30 shows payback periods based on 
different discount rate assumptions. If consumers form beliefs on future gasoline price, the 
average payback periods of beliefs are less than the current gasoline price’s payback periods. 
So, if we assume no change to the future forecast assumption, we are likely to overestimate 
payback periods which in turn underestimate the likelihood of buying hybrid vehicles. 
Therefore, we need to be careful about estimating the likelihood of buying a hybrid vehicle 
concerning future gasoline price assumptions in economic models, particularly during periods 
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Table 30. Payback Periods (Hybrid Vehicle) 
 Discount Rates Average Payback Periods 
The Current Gasoline Price 0.03 3.84 
 0.05 3.76 
 0.1 3.57 
 0.15 3.37 
 0.2 3.17 
Expected one-year future gasoline 
price 0.03 3.55 
 0.05 3.47 
 0.1 3.3 
 0.15 3.11 
 0.2 2.93 
Expected five-year future gasoline 
price 0.03 3.62 
 0.05 3.58 
 0.1 3.39 
 0.15 3.2 
 0.2 3.01 
 
4.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
It is plausible that consumers form beliefs about future gasoline price based on the 
current price, and it matters in terms of on the likelihood of buying hybrid cars based on rational 
and cognitive thinking processes. This paper tests this hypothesis by utilizing Michigan 
Consumer Survey data. We find statistical evidence to support the relationship between gasoline 
price and the willingness to buy more hybrid cars. We also find statistically significant evidence 
of the long-term future gasoline price beliefs on considering hybrid vehicles. 
This finding has important policy implications related to taxation. This is because the 
gasoline tax’s effectiveness depends on whether people respond to the gasoline price change. Of 
course, this is a stated preference study, and state preferences have a tenuous relationship with 
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actual purchasing decisions. Still, it suggests the gasoline tax, which internalizes negative 
externalities are preferable to the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFÉ) standards. The most 
obvious policy to spur the future adoption of more fuel-efficient cars would be to increase the 
gasoline tax. It is not a surprising finding because it is well known that standards are less 
efficient than fuel taxes (Anderson & Sallee, 2016). 
Energy policy scholars, including behavioral technology analysts may disagree with the 
fundamental assumption that we made in this paper. They may argue that consumers’ decision-
making is far from a rational preference maximization and that consumers do not form an 
explicit belief.87 This is an open-ended question to both groups of scholars: economists and 
behavioral researchers. At least, the current consensus on the energy policy community is to 
adopt insights from as many behaviorist as possible (H. Allcott & Mullainathan, 2010; Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008). 
The evidence that we show in this paper is based on the assumption that we live in a 
world of decreasing gasoline prices. It is a bit challenging to generalize this finding to the 
context of increasing the gasoline price world because the financial crisis of 2008 could be an 
important factor to consider. It is legitimate to ask what would happen when the price of gasoline 
increases. People can behave either similarly or differently. This is an unanswered question, and 
which can be addressed in future research.  
 
                                                 
87 This never-ending discussion is well summarized in Sanstad and Howarth's (1994) paper. 
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Figure 17. △Expected Future Gasoline Price 
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Table 31. Correlation Matrix 
 Gasoline price E_PX1 E_PX5 
Gasoline price 1   
E_PX1 0.6957* 1  
 0   
E_PX5 0.8775* 0.7489* 1 
 0 0  
No. of Obs. 1260 1260 1260 
1. Significant at 95% * 
Table 32. EIA region and Census Division 
States EIA_region States AB 
Census 
Division 
Connecticut PADD 1A Connecticut CT 1 
Massachusetts PADD 1A Massachusetts MA 1 
Maine PADD 1A Maine ME 1 
New Hampshire PADD 1A New Hampshire NH 1 
Rhode Island PADD 1A Rhode Island RI 1 
Vermont PADD 1A Vermont VT 1 
New Jersey PADD 1B New Jersey NJ 2 
New York PADD 1B New York NY 2 
Pennsylvania PADD 1B Pennsylvania PA 2 
Illinois PADD 2 Illinois IL 3 
Indiana PADD 2 Indiana IN 3 
Michigan PADD 2 Michigan MI 3 
Ohio PADD 2 Ohio OH 3 
Wisconsin PADD 2 Wisconsin WI 3 
Iowa PADD 2 Iowa IA 4 
Kansas PADD 2 Kansas KS 4 
Minnesota PADD 2 Minnesota MN 4 
Missouri PADD 2 Missouri MO 4 
North Dakota PADD 2 North Dakota ND 4 
Nebraska PADD 2 Nebraska NE 4 
South Dakota PADD 2 South Dakota SD 4 
District of Columbia PADD 1B District of Columbia DC 5 
Delaware PADD 1B Delaware DE 5 
Maryland PADD 1B Maryland MD 5 
Florida PADD 1C Florida FL 5 
Georgia PADD 1C Georgia GA 5 
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Table 32 continued     
North Carolina PADD 1C North Carolina NC 5 
Virginia PADD 1C Virginia VA 5 
West Virginia PADD 1C West Virginia WV 5 
South Carolina PADD 1C South Carolina SC 5 
Kentucky PADD 2 Kentucky KY 6 
Tennessee PADD 2 Tennessee TN 6 
Alabama PADD 3 Alabama AL 6 
Mississippi PADD 3 Mississippi MS 6 
Oklahoma PADD 2 Oklahoma OK 7 
Arkansas PADD 3 Arkansas AR 7 
Louisiana PADD 3 Louisiana LA 7 
Texas PADD 3 Texas TX 7 
New Mexico PADD 3 New Mexico NM 8 
Colorado PADD 4 Colorado CO 8 
Idaho PADD 4 Idaho ID 8 
Montana PADD 4 Montana MT 8 
Utah PADD 4 Utah UT 8 
Wyoming PADD 4 Wyoming WY 8 
Arizona PADD 5 Arizona AZ 8 
Nevada PADD 5 Nevada NV 8 
California PADD 5 California CA 9 
Oregon PADD 5 Oregon OR 9 
Washington PADD 5 Washington WA 9 
Alaska PADD 5 Alaska AK 9 
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Table 33. Monthly Retail Gasoline and Diesel Prices (Dollars per Gallon, including taxes)  
 












































































2008 4.085 4.111 4.148 4.063 3.994 3.992 4.132 4.278 4.278 
Aug-
2008 3.818 3.865 3.887 3.794 3.733 3.711 3.972 4.008 4.008 
Sep-
2008 3.812 3.71 3.749 3.838 3.732 3.709 3.765 3.786 3.786 
Oct-
2008 3.215 3.141 3.239 3.212 2.913 2.963 3.192 3.305 3.305 
Nov-
2008 2.262 2.406 2.457 2.193 2.007 2.103 2.203 2.476 2.476 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH 
This dissertation comprises three essays that explore different areas of economics of 
energy innovation and product diffusion. The first two essays are related to economics of energy 
innovation, and the third essay is about energy-efficient product diffusion. In this chapter, we 
review the contributions of this dissertation and discuss directions for future research. 
The ultimate goal of this dissertation is to answer the following question: “Can energy 
efficiency policy accelerate energy innovation?” In a nutshell, the answer is yes, but it depends 
on the kinds of policy instruments that we indicated in the first chapter and on how appropriate 
energy policies are used in conjunction with one another. What we have found in this dissertation 
is contrary to Sachs’ claims. The third essay indicates the importance of a gasoline tax, which is 
one type of carbon pricing policy that creates demand for clean vehicles. In the transportation 
sector, carbon pricing policies are not as effective as they are in other sectors such as the 
electricity market. Therefore, technology push policies like CAFÉ standards are also required to 
force manufacturers to make more energy-efficient vehicles.  
The first essay addresses whether voluntary environmental programs positively affect 
innovation in household appliance firms. While literature evaluating voluntary environmental 
programs has described mixed findings on the effectiveness of such programs, we found 
statistically significant evidence of the impact of the ENERGY STAR program on participating 
firms’ patents. The results reveal a causal relationship between the ENERGY STAR program 
and innovation. This chapter can contribute to the work of two groups: (a) those involved in 
environmental management and corporate sustainability, and (b) environmental economists. 
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Additionally, when we design a clean environmental policy, we can anticipate negative 
externality as well as positive knowledge spillover effects. 
One possible avenue for future research is the crowding effects between mandatory 
environmental policy and voluntary environmental policy. It is plausible that increases in energy 
patents in response to voluntary environmental policy lead to decreases in energy patents in 
response to mandatory environmental policy change. Additionally, we can develop a new index 
of policy uncertainty that negatively affects investment and therefore innovation.  
The second essay seeks to answer the innovation of CFL and LED lighting technologies 
across multiple countries. To increase the innovation and diffusion of more energy-efficient 
lighting technologies, several factors were needed. First and foremost, a policy driver was 
required to affect foreign and domestic inventors. Technological advances were made because of 
the energy-efficiency policy; global firms were forced to invest in R&D so as to produce more 
energy-efficient light bulbs. Because LEDs are greener than CFLs, firms have more incentive to 
conduct R&D in LEDs than in CFLs, as regulations are becoming more stringent. This chapter 
also provides evidence to support the importance of policy certainty which further encourages 
innovation switching from incandescent light bulbs or CFLs to LEDs and will generate energy 
savings and reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. 
While the second essay uses a country-level unit of analysis, future areas of research can 
also be found in the more detailed analyses of firm-level innovation. Due to the restriction of 
obtaining firm-level data between 1990 and 2007, we mainly focus on country-level analysis in 
this essay. We collect information on financial data for a sample of firms, including total assets, 
turnover, and the number of employees from the ORBIS database of Bureau Van Dijk (BvDEP). 
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ORBIS89 is a global database that integrates information held across BvDEP's company. We use 
the same IPC classification of lighting technologies to retrieve relevant patents. To match 
between PATSTAT firm names and companies listed in the ORBIS database, we employ a 
company name disambiguation. Building on Noailly and Smeets's (2015) novel approach, we 
make a distinction between small firms that file a patent in one type of technology and those that 
innovate in both techniques. We investigate how LED innovation occurs in either large or 
specialized/nascent firms. We examine factors that affect firms’ decisions both at the intensive 
and extensive margins using difference-in-difference with a propensity score matching technique 
(Debaere, Lee, & Lee, 2010).  
Another possibility is to test the weak and strong versions of the Porter Hypothesis. The 
weak version of the Porter Hypothesis holds that well established environmental regulations give 
a firm an incentive to develop innovative abatement technology. On the other hand, the strong 
version of the Porter Hypothesis suggests that environmental regulation can lead to an increase in 
firm competitiveness. In regard to testing the weak version of the Porter Hypothesis, Jaffe and 
Palmer (1997) is the seminal study that investigates the relationship between total R&D 
expenditures (or the number of patent applications) and pollution abatement costs. Subsequently, 
numerous studies have found a positive relationship between environmental regulation and 
innovation (Brunnermeier & Cohen, 2003; Arimura, Hibiki, & Katayama, 2008; Lanoie et al., 
2011; Popp, 2003, 2006b). In addition, Lanoie, Patry, and Lajeunesse (2008) found evidence to 
support the strong version of the Porter Hypothesis by observing extended periods. 
                                                 
89 ORBIS has information on over 57 million public and private companies’ size, revenue, turnover, and other useful 
firm-level information. We accessed and downloaded the data as a former student user at Texas A&M University 
library database on December 23, 2015. However, we can only obtain the recent ten-year firm financial information: 
2007-2016 
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The missing component in this dissertation is the role of an institution that can shape 
policy decisions. For example, the U.S. government has a Department of Energy (DOE), which 
fosters energy innovation. The DOE was created in 1977 to deal with the oil crisis. The funding 
activity of the DOE follows a boom-and-bust cycle that depends on the federal government’s 
engagement with energy issues. In particular, the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy 
(ARPA-E) was created by President Barack Obama on April 27, 2009, to promote and fund 
R&D for energy technologies. The agency’s initial funding was $151 million. It is difficult to 
examine the effectiveness of this program at this moment, but the agency is a positive pathway to 
achieving LED innovation. Therefore, ARPA-E funding since 2009 can be interpreted as a 
stimulus for LED innovation.  
Another important matter that is not addressed in this dissertation is the role of 
incandescent light bulb phase-out (i.e., EISA90) in inducing CFL and LED innovation. It seems 
that the phasing out of incandescent light bulbs in multiple countries resulted in technological 
advances in CFLs and LEDs. These technologies have been developed and commercialized 
because firms were forced to stop manufacturing incandescent light bulbs and to instead produce 
alternative technologies. After the incandescent light bulb phase-out, the industry observed a 
significant increase in ENERGY STAR-certified CFLs and LEDs, which implies innovation in 
lighting technologies, given that the ENERGY STAR standards have been strengthened over the 
course of years. For example, while only 36 LED light bulbs were eligible for ENERGY STAR 
certification in 2010, approximately 1,000 LED products received ENERGY STAR approval in 
2012. In order to measure the impact of the EISA 2007, it is more appropriate to use the number 
                                                 
90 EISA entered into law on 19 December 2007. 
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of ENERGY STAR products in the market as opposed to the traditional patent counts as a 
measure of innovation. This is because most LED patents have reached maturity. We can 
investigate the impact of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) in the 
United States, which phased out 100 W incandescent light bulbs in 2012, 75 W in 2013, and 40 
W and 60 W in 2014, on lighting innovation using recent patent and firm-level data. 
The final essay uses the Michigan Survey of Consumers data to examine the relationship 
between beliefs about the future gasoline beliefs and the willingness to purchase hybrid or plug-
in hybrid vehicles. The third essay of this dissertation is a bit different from the previous two 
chapters in two aspects. First, the unit of analysis is a household, not a firm. Second, the nature 
of the research design is survey data analysis.  
It is still unknown which theoretical foundation best explains the formation of beliefs 
about the future of gas prices. However, this chapter shows that long-term future expectations are 
a better predictor of willingness to buy hybrid vehicles than the short-term future gasoline price 
beliefs.  
With respect to the dissemination of green products, researchers have focused on 
identifying factors that motivate the consumption of environmentally friendly products. This is in 
part because a better understanding of consumer preferences for energy-efficient vehicles can 
make policies work more efficiently and effectively. The findings in this chapter can contribute 
to the research of transportation policy groups and behavioral economists. 
 These behavioral science components of stated or revealed preference studies are an 
important avenue for future research. Economic studies such as discrete choice analyses can 
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incorporate vehicle attribute changes as well as psychological variables. In other words, a 
discrete-choice framework allows for both economic and psychological studies. The discrete-
choice model has evolved from the multinomial logit model to a nested/mixed logit model. My 
future research aims to the above econometric models to answer the following questions: (1) 
How do different types of incentive policies impact the adoption of electric vehicles? (2) How 
can we incorporate psychological studies into discrete-choice modeling?  
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APPENDIX A. RAW DATA AND ADDITIONAL ESTIMATION RESULTS 
This appendix illustrates raw data used in the chapter 3. 
Table 34. RD&D Budgets per GDP 
RD&D Budgets per thousand units of GDP                 
PRODUCT RD&D per thousand units of GDP                
                    
TIME 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
COUNTRY                    
Australia 0.24    0.24  0.23  0.28  0.21  0.21  0.18 0.35 0.24 0.26 0.27 
Austria 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.11 
Belgium 0.28     0.20 0.21 0.26 0.24 0.30 0.20        0.27 
Canada 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.43 0.41 0.39 0.35 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.24 0.35 0.41 0.41 
Denmark 0.19 0.25 0.30 0.34 0.33 0.26 0.24 0.20 0.23 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.12 0.12 0.23 0.33 0.36 0.43 
Finland  0.36 0.41 0.45 0.46 0.53 0.59 0.55 0.72 0.68 0.61 0.48 0.43 0.48 0.39 0.51 0.48 0.59 0.77 
France 0.47 0.44 0.43 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.44 0.40 0.29 0.50 0.49 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45 
Germany   0.28 0.21 0.21 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Italy 0.66 0.57 0.51  0.27 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.20  0.21 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.17 0.23 0.22 
Japan 0.90 0.82 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 1.04 0.93 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.79 
Korea              0.15  0.42 0.37 0.46 0.52 
Netherlands 0.52 0.53 0.51 0.48 0.53 0.54 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.36 0.34 0.28 0.33 0.28 0.25  0.22 0.23 0.34 
New Zealand  0.03 0.03  0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.12 
Norway 0.45 0.44 0.48 0.49 0.44 0.41 0.32 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.30 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.32 0.35 
Spain 0.15 0.10 0.22 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 
Sweden 0.42 0.39 0.35 0.44 0.34 0.34 0.24 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.27 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.19 0.26 0.26 
Switzerland 0.50 0.52 0.53 0.58 0.57 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.47 0.43 0.41 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.30 
United Kingdom 0.34 0.27 0.22 0.20 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.10 
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Table 35. Household Electricity Price 
Household electricity price: Total price (USD/unit)                  
COUNTRY PRODUCT 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Australia Electricity (MWh) 71 70 74 84 73 92 71 1 77 79 79 43 83 9 80 4 68 52 
Austria Electricity (MWh) 155 69 154 25 170 96 163 43 166 39 191 54 193 89 169 30 167 85 
Belgium Electricity (MWh) 166 59 159 50 170 14 164 2 172 26 198 8 186 98 164 45 163 33 
Canada Electricity (MWh) 53 12 61 16 61 71 60 69 57 91 57 5 57 78 57 69 54 53 
Denmark Electricity (MWh) 164 47 172 85 187 35 179 80 180 43 208 61 215 38 195 26 213 7 
Finland Electricity (MWh) 102 80 101 3 94 3 80 46 88 38 108 86 110 75 100 46 97 89 
France Electricity (MWh) 150 12 141 16 153 41 146 47 150 12 166 62 163 85 133 93 129 3 
Germany Electricity (MWh) 163 80 159 32 171 84 169 11 178 43 203 0 180 36 159 30 159 33 
Italy Electricity (MWh) 156 70 172 54 182 8 145 81 164 11 169 32 177 67 159 50 159 31 
Japan Electricity (MWh) 176 80 191 8 202 89 230 26 249 44 269 48 230 10 207 27 186 72 
Korea Electricity (MWh) 96 19 98 60 103 8 101 19 106 95 112 9 110 58 96 84 68 98 
Netherlands Electricity (MWh) 117 19 114 15 119 5 112 81 115 25 135 3 147 97 129 72 127 86 
New Zealand Electricity (MWh) 54 97 56 71 55 20 58 23 67 38 78 29 87 26 88 65 70 59 
Norway Electricity (MWh) 73 34 72 95 75 47 67 66 67 46 78 43 81 33 77 74 67 0 
Spain Electricity (MWh) 189 72 198 24 211 6 176 73 176 2 194 53 190 67 163 41 154 68 
Sweden Electricity (MWh) 87 87 96 94 105 44 81 95 84 63 94 48 109 59 101 24 110 196 
Switzerland Electricity (MWh) 110 74 112 9 119 86 118 86 131 23 165 30 159 45 135 52 134 92 
United Kingdom Electricity (MWh) 118 47 129 48 135 51 115 62 121 69 127 19 125 47 125 14 120 78 
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Table 36. Household Electricity Consumption Growth Rate 
Electricity Consumption Growth 
rate_household                 
COUNTRY 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Australia 5.23 1.83 0.18 3.37 -0.20 3.95 2.47 3.64 3.14 2.46 3.05 1.71 3.33 4.31 3.86 -1.22 1.51 3.07 
Austria 3.05 6.10 1.34 2.89 -1.23 4.72 4.47 -2.22 0.45 4.88 2.30 8.33 3.21 3.26 -0.90 2.16 -0.10 -0.97 
Belgium 3.95 8.05 1.75 4.17 1.27 3.52 5.07 -1.27 1.98 0.40 1.09 2.77 6.25 0.41 1.99 -2.02 -12.63 -3.81 
Canada -0.02 -0.34 2.20 0.13 0.36 -0.96 2.76 -0.56 -3.84 3.06 3.71 1.45 1.71 3.75 2.02 0.01 -2.43 7.14 
Denmark -2.33 4.81 0.73 1.20 0.93 -1.28 2.92 -2.63 -0.52 0.20 -0.67 -0.55 0.31 0.71 0.68 1.13 1.19 -2.12 
Finland 8.18 7.13 1.39 2.88 4.11 -4.27 6.02 1.09 4.13 1.70 -1.68 6.80 2.94 2.32 -0.32 1.52 3.36 0.70 
France 3.63 10.23 2.60 1.71 -0.22 -2.14 10.72 -1.18 3.41 3.07 1.41 4.01 -0.66 6.43 1.29 -3.42 3.50 -1.21 
Germany 0.55 
-
10.87 0.53 2.68 -1.24 2.12 5.48 -2.49 -0.26 0.62 -0.59 2.68 1.87 1.90 0.93 0.64 0.14 -0.99 
Italy 3.44 3.70 1.94 1.21 1.08 0.39 1.32 0.84 1.35 2.43 0.65 0.72 2.28 3.27 2.42 0.55 1.01 -0.61 
Japan 4.26 4.20 3.44 2.81 8.11 4.17 1.34 1.52 3.44 2.91 2.45 -0.26 3.37 -1.60 4.71 3.34 -1.23 4.08 
Korea 16.87 9.85 11.88 9.73 11.03 6.59 8.26 6.11 1.22 5.07 7.29 5.68 7.82 5.43 9.07 4.65 3.27 3.15 
Netherlands 3.13 3.64 2.34 2.29 3.35 6.49 1.53 2.00 1.97 2.65 2.12 1.39 3.18 2.25 0.87 2.98 2.48 -2.17 
New Zealand 3.75 2.19 -2.18 0.22 1.75 1.36 3.50 -0.37 2.24 -0.13 1.56 3.02 0.59 3.56 1.75 -1.24 4.29 -1.65 
Norway 4.97 7.64 0.11 0.42 3.75 1.80 1.91 -3.71 3.15 -0.01 -1.16 3.57 -3.43 -7.57 1.19 4.94 -1.06 3.87 
Spain 2.33 2.26 1.67 3.04 7.45 3.50 4.24 6.90 3.98 8.98 -4.01 13.91 1.91 7.11 7.03 7.82 8.47 0.49 
Sweden 0.27 8.13 -2.39 4.04 1.62 -0.30 2.20 -1.72 -0.19 -5.49 4.62 0.38 -1.68 1.27 -1.48 3.11 -2.75 -4.46 
Switzerland -0.12 4.81 2.30 0.04 0.15 3.43 4.03 -2.70 1.77 2.88 1.09 2.24 1.31 2.38 2.61 2.99 0.44 -1.30 
United Kingdom 1.65 4.59 1.41 0.98 0.95 0.79 5.19 -2.84 4.74 0.82 1.39 3.12 -0.70 7.39 0.97 1.22 -0.80 -1.31 
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Table 37. GDP Growth Rate 
GDP(output approach) growth rate                  
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Australia 2.68 1.95 4.98 5.10 6.20 6.74 5.22 5.76 5.36 6.53 6.73 6.84 6.29 7.58 7.05 8.21 8.92 8.41 
Austria 7.48 7.21 5.65 3.30 4.99 4.53 3.38 3.39 3.99 3.88 4.81 3.24 2.82 2.08 4.55 4.76 5.32 5.96 
Belgium 6.04 4.76 5.01 2.99 5.39 3.63 2.00 4.56 3.75 4.25 5.70 2.98 3.50 2.80 5.70 4.29 5.21 5.41 
Canada 3.51 0.89 2.36 3.96 6.07 5.04 3.47 5.44 3.92 6.95 9.61 3.34 4.06 5.32 6.52 6.47 5.40 5.31 
Denmark 4.49 4.01 3.69 0.58 7.14 4.36 4.97 5.34 3.48 4.68 6.88 3.36 2.82 1.88 4.77 5.40 6.06 3.36 
Finland 5.91 -4.45 -2.43 1.06 5.85 8.58 3.56 8.50 8.71 5.43 7.36 6.00 2.67 2.21 4.56 3.73 5.00 8.09 
France 5.66 3.64 3.62 1.02 3.30 3.26 2.77 3.24 4.54 3.63 5.48 3.99 3.21 2.71 4.48 3.58 4.59 4.99 
Germany 8.83 8.35 7.31 3.14 4.67 3.75 1.45 2.12 2.60 2.31 2.50 2.99 1.35 0.49 2.28 1.33 4.02 5.01 
Italy 11.08 9.24 5.24 3.00 5.77 7.95 5.90 4.49 4.19 3.21 5.75 4.81 3.61 3.34 4.15 2.86 3.94 3.95 
Japan 7.96 6.02 2.42 0.61 0.98 1.20 2.04 2.20 -2.06 -1.47 0.98 -0.85 -1.27 -0.06 0.98 0.04 0.55 1.24 
Korea 20.91 20.82 14.40 13.47 18.05 17.18 12.17 10.23 -1.11 9.99 10.11 8.34 10.72 6.43 8.03 5.00 5.03 7.99 
Netherlands 5.81 5.63 4.24 2.88 5.08 5.24 4.80 7.04 6.67 6.56 8.01 6.39 3.74 2.46 3.41 4.14 6.16 5.88 
New Zealand 2.58 -0.21 3.12 7.97 7.12 6.22 5.06 3.67 1.92 5.99 5.84 7.40 5.16 6.89 7.00 5.56 5.16 8.30 
Norway 5.82 5.36 2.91 5.20 4.89 7.34 9.50 8.22 1.92 8.81 19.13 3.76 -0.28 3.81 10.03 11.61 11.38 6.07 
Spain 11.38 9.66 7.70 3.46 6.36 7.83 6.24 6.16 6.95 7.27 8.74 8.24 7.11 7.23 7.21 8.03 8.32 7.23 
Sweden 10.30 7.01 -0.15 0.10 6.75 7.98 2.57 4.52 5.04 5.51 6.37 4.11 3.70 4.19 4.77 3.64 6.59 6.39 
Switzerland 8.45 4.44 2.08 2.19 2.47 1.22 0.81 2.10 2.82 1.83 5.35 2.49 -0.19 1.00 3.24 3.70 6.04 6.50 
United Kingdom 8.68 5.25 3.74 5.29 5.29 5.07 6.80 5.09 5.07 4.32 6.26 3.79 5.17 6.57 5.43 5.69 5.81 5.50 
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This appendix illustrates additional triple difference-in-difference estimation results in the 
chapter 3. 
Table 38. Triple difference-in-difference estimation results (US) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES numberofpatent numberofpatent numberofpatent 
POST_epa_US_led -47.96 -74.19 -72.81 
 (157.0) (125.8) (120.4) 
POST_epa_led 270.3*** 296.6*** 295.2*** 
 (82.97) (79.13) (80.22) 
US_led 73.62 73.62 73.62 
 (80.60) (75.22) (63.13) 
US -1,314*** -826.1*** -933.9*** 
 (233.6) (238.2) (263.7) 
POST_epa -206.9** -115.9** -172.6* 
 (92.47) (50.60) (100.6) 
POST_epa_US 220.3* 189.1** 210.3** 
 (114.2) (89.19) (94.95) 
rdd 2.313*** 1.563*** 1.692*** 
 (0.401) (0.403) (0.440) 
elec_price 0.447* 0.665 0.304 
 (0.256) (0.539) (0.454) 
elec_con 7.659 -1.393 -2.371 
 (7.687) (5.959) (7.321) 
gdp 40.20*** 6.037 24.00 
 (14.43) (8.509) (18.45) 
Constant -96.08** -136.5 -76.44 
 (45.70) (95.43) (77.43) 
    
Observations 428 428 428 
R-squared 0.458 0.538 0.551 
Year FE YES NO YES 
Country FE NO YES YES 
Notes: 
1. POST equals 1 after 2005 
2. US indicates those whose inventor country location is United States. 
3. Observations indicate the number of countries multiplied by the number of years 
4. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 39. Triple difference-in-difference estimation results (Korea) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES numberofpatent numberofpatent numberofpatent 
POST_epa_KR_led 337.2 341.3 341.8 
 (318.0) (355.2) (349.2) 
POST_epa_led 211.4** 207.3*** 206.8*** 
 (85.85) (70.21) (70.96) 
KR_led 1,053*** 1,053*** 1,053*** 
 (287.7) (328.0) (323.1) 
KR 143.4 220.6*** 136.2* 
 (87.90) (65.44) (69.42) 
POST_epa 2.014 -89.63** -71.81 
 (77.48) (40.87) (84.83) 
POST_epa_KR 121.8 131.4*** 182.8*** 
 (89.11) (36.61) (59.02) 
rdd 0.908*** 0.669*** 0.624*** 
 (0.199) (0.164) (0.156) 
elec_price 1.285*** 1.900*** 1.299** 
 (0.397) (0.665) (0.567) 
elec_con 2.613 -0.276 -1.412 
 (7.278) (5.737) (7.094) 
gdp -42.08*** 2.086 9.978 
 (10.85) (7.696) (15.16) 
Constant -128.7** -398.5*** -344.1*** 
 (57.13) (131.4) (125.1) 
    
Observations 428 428 428 
R-squared 0.399 0.583 0.592 
Year FE YES NO YES 
Country FE NO YES YES 
Notes: 
1. POST equals 1 after 2005 
2. KR indicates those whose inventor country location is South Korea. 
3. Observations indicate the number of countries multiplied by the number of years 
4. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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This appendix illustrates additional negative binomial model estimation results in the 
chapter 2. 
Table 40. Negative Binomial Estimation with fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES No. of Patents lnalpha No. of Patents lnalpha 
ES_year 0.345***  0.788***  
 (0.130)  (0.269)  
roa -0.0254***  -0.0103  
 (0.00671)  (0.0208)  
dta -2.906  4.199***  
 (2.353)  (0.341)  
avgemp3years_ln 0.828  0.170  
 (0.630)  (0.136)  
avgcapx3years_ln_norm 5.74e-05  -0.00177  
 (0.000320)  (0.00148)  
elecprice -0.00216**  -0.00486*  
 (0.000874)  (0.00254)  
Constant -0.462 -1.022*** -0.136 0.361 
 (2.224) (0.285) (0.865) (0.293) 
YEAR FE NO  YES  
FIRM FE YES  NO  
Observations 309 309 309 309 
Notes: 
(1), (3). Std. Err. adjusted for 8 clusters in industry 
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